Alimony in New York.
Whether the state sets a formula or leaves it to the judge, what the court has to weigh, how long it runs, and what brings it to an end.
See a different stateNew York
Two guidelines, in two subdivisions, using the same arithmetic. Post-divorce, s. 236, Part B, subd. 6, para. c, verbatim: 'Where the payor's income is lower than or equal to the income cap, the court shall determine the guideline amount of post-divorce maintenance as follows: (1) Where child support will be paid for children of the marriage and where the payor as defined in this subdivision is also the non-custodial parent pursuant to the child support standards act: (a) the court shall subtract twenty-five percent of the payee's income from twenty percent of the payor's income. (b) the court shall then multiply the sum of the payor's income and the payee's income by forty percent. (c) the court shall subtract the payee's income from the amount derived from clause (b) of this subparagraph. (d) the court shall determine the lower of the two amounts derived by clauses (a) and (c) of this subparagraph. (e) the guideline amount of post-divorce maintenance shall be the amount determined by clause (d) of this subparagraph except that, if the amount determined by clause (d) of this subparagraph is less than or equal to zero, the guideline amount of post-divorce maintenance shall be zero dollars. (f) notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision, where the guideline amount of post-divorce maintenance would reduce the payor's income below the self-support reserve for a single person, the guideline amount of post-divorce maintenance shall be the difference between the payor's income and the self-support reserve. If the payor's income is below the self-support reserve, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that no post-divorce maintenance is awarded. (g) maintenance shall be calculated prior to child support because the amount of maintenance shall be subtracted from the payor's income and added to the payee's income as part of the calculation of the child support obligation. (2) Where child support will not be paid for children of the marriage, or where child support will be paid for children of the marriage but the payor as defined in this subdivision is the custodial parent pursuant to the child support standards act: (a) the court shall subtract twenty percent of the payee's income from thirty percent of the payor's income. (b) the court shall then multiply the sum of the payor's income and the payee's income by forty percent. (c) the court shall subtract the payee's income from the amount derived from clause (b) of this subparagraph. (d) the court shall determine the lower of the two amounts derived by clauses (a) and (c) of this subparagraph. (e) the guideline amount of post-divorce maintenance shall be the amount determined by clause (d) of this subparagraph except that, if the amount determined by clause (d) of this subparagraph is less than or equal to zero, the guideline amount of post-divorce maintenance shall be zero dollars …'. Above the cap, subd. 6, para. d, verbatim: 'Where the payor's income exceeds the income cap, the court shall determine the guideline amount of post-divorce maintenance as follows: (1) the court shall perform the calculations set forth in paragraph c of this subdivision for the income of payor up to and including the income cap; and (2) for income exceeding the cap, the amount of additional maintenance awarded, if any, shall be within the discretion of the court which shall take into consideration any one or more of the factors set forth in subparagraph one of paragraph e of this subdivision; and (3) the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision in writing or on the record. Such decision, whether in writing or on the record, may not be waived by either party or counsel.' THE INCOME CAP. The definition appears twice in identical words, at subd. 5-a, para. b(5) and subd. 6, para. b(4), verbatim: '"Income cap" shall mean up to and including one hundred eighty-four thousand dollars of the payor's annual income; provided, however, beginning March first, two thousand twenty and every two years thereafter, the income cap amount shall increase by the sum of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) as published by the United States department of labor bureau of labor statistics for the prior two years multiplied by the then income cap and then rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars. The office of court administration shall determine and publish the income cap.' Read that figure carefully, because almost everywhere it is quoted, it is quoted wrongly. $184,000 is the number in the statute, and it is the base the adjustments run from rather than the cap in force. Every two years the Office of Court Administration recalculates it by CPI-U and publishes the new number, the first of those adjustments 'beginning March first, two thousand twenty'. The operative figure today is whatever the OCA has most recently published. We could not read that notice. Every nycourts.gov address returned a bot-protection challenge, and we do not defeat those. So there is no current New York income cap figure anywhere on this page. If somebody quotes you one, the fair question is which OCA notice it came from. $184,000 is not the 2015 figure either, which is the other way this number is commonly misreported. The Act the Assembly posts, A7645 of 2015, reads 'one hundred seventy-five thousand dollars', with adjustments 'beginning January thirty-first, two thousand sixteen'. The section has been amended since. The statutory text quoted above was read on the New York State Legislature's own Legislative Retrieval System, whose Laws pages state that the database is current through 2026 Chapters 1-234. The Senate's site and the whole nycourts.gov estate refused automated access.
Use the state’s own words
New York calls it maintenance. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law s. 236, Part B uses 'temporary maintenance' (subd. 5-a) for support during the action and 'post-divorce maintenance' (subd. 6) for the award made on judgment. 'Alimony' is the Part A word, and Part A governs only actions commenced before the 1980 effective date: Part A is captioned 'PRIOR ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS' and its subd. 1 is captioned 'Alimony, temporary and permanent'. In Family Court the same money is called 'spousal support' and is governed by N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act s. 412. A page that says New York 'calls it maintenance' is right about Supreme Court and wrong about Family Court.. Using the state’s own term matters when you are searching for forms or reading an order — the words are not interchangeable across state lines, and some of them mean different things in different places. The 2015 restructuring was read from the New York State Assembly's own posted text of A7645, signed as chapter 269 of the Laws of 2015. The Senate's site and the court system's site both refused automated access, so neither the current consolidated text nor the current income cap notice could be checked there – which is why no current cap figure appears on this page.
What the law actually says
The power the court has
What the judge has to weigh
How long it lasts
Duration
Advisory, and the statute says so. S. 236, Part B, subd. 6, para. f, verbatim: '(1) The court may determine the duration of post-divorce maintenance in accordance with the following advisory schedule: Length of the marriage / Percent of the length of the marriage for which maintenance will be payable: 0 up to and including 15 years, 15% – 30%; More than 15 up to and including 20 years, 30% – 40%; More than 20 years, 35% – 50%. (2) In determining the duration of post-divorce maintenance, whether or not the court utilizes the advisory schedule, it shall consider the factors listed in subparagraph one of paragraph e of this subdivision and shall set forth, in a written decision or on the record, the factors it considered. Such decision shall not be waived by either party or counsel. Nothing herein shall prevent the court from awarding non-durational maintenance in an appropriate case.' 'Length of marriage' is defined at subd. 6, para. b(8) as 'the period from the date of marriage until the date of commencement of the action.' Retirement is folded into duration rather than treated as a termination event, subd. 6, para. f(4), verbatim: 'Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph one of this paragraph, when determining duration of post-divorce maintenance, the court shall take into consideration anticipated retirement assets, benefits, and retirement eligibility age of both parties if ascertainable at the time of decision. If not ascertainable at the time of decision, the actual full or partial retirement of the payor with substantial diminution of income shall be a basis for a modification of the award.' Note the divergence: the amount guideline is mandatory subject to a deviation finding, but the duration schedule is expressly advisory. New York has one formula and one suggestion, and they sit in adjacent paragraphs of the same subdivision.
Does behavior matter?
Marital misconduct
Part B has no marital-misconduct factor and no fault bar. None of the fifteen factors in subd. 6, para. e(1) names adultery, cruelty, abandonment or fault, and there is no provision barring or compelling maintenance on any such ground. Two factors touch conduct with economic or physical consequences and stop there: (e) 'the wasteful dissipation of marital property, including transfers or encumbrances made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration', and (g) 'acts by one party against another that have inhibited or continue to inhibit a party's earning capacity or ability to obtain meaningful employment. Such acts include but are not limited to acts of domestic violence as provided in section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law'. Misconduct does appear in the same section, but in Part A, which governs only actions commenced before the 1980 effective date. Part A, subd. 1, verbatim: a direction to support may be made 'notwithstanding that the court refuses to grant the relief requested by either spouse (1) by reason of a finding by the court that a divorce, annulment or judgment declaring the marriage a nullity had previously been granted to either spouse in an action in which jurisdiction over the person of the other spouse was not obtained, or (2) by reason of the misconduct of the other spouse, unless such misconduct would itself constitute grounds for separation or divorce, or (3) by reason of a failure of proof of the grounds of either spouse's action or counterclaim.' Reading that Part A clause as current New York maintenance law is an error; Part B controls every action commenced on or after the effective date.
When it ends, and when it can change
What brings it to an end
Death and remarriage, s. 236, Part B, subd. 6, para. f(3), verbatim: 'Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph one of this paragraph, post-divorce maintenance shall terminate upon the death of either party or upon the payee's valid or invalid marriage, or upon modification pursuant to paragraph b of subdivision nine of this part or section two hundred forty-eight of this article.' The phrase 'valid or invalid marriage' is deliberate: a marriage that turns out to be void still ends maintenance. Section 248 then supplies two different remedies, and the verbs differ. Verbatim: 'Where an action for divorce or for annulment or for a declaration of the nullity of a void marriage is brought by a spouse, and a final judgment of divorce or a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring its nullity has been rendered, the court, by order upon the application of the payor on notice, and on proof of the marriage of the payee after such final judgment, must modify such final judgment and any orders made with respect thereto by annulling the provisions of such final judgment or orders, or of both, directing payments of money for the support of the payee. The court in its discretion upon application of the payor on notice, upon proof that the payee is habitually living with another person and holding himself or herself out as the spouse of such other person, although not married to such other person, may modify such final judgment and any orders made with respect thereto by annulling the provisions of such final judgment or orders or of both, directing payment of money for the support of such payee.' On proof of remarriage the court 'must' annul the support provisions. On proof of living with another person the court 'may', and only where two elements are proved: that the payee 'is habitually living with another person' AND is 'holding himself or herself out as the spouse of such other person'. DIVERGENCE FLAG. It is widely said that cohabitation ends maintenance in New York. The statute says a court may modify, in its discretion, and only on the holding-out element. Living together, however long and however openly, does not satisfy s. 248 by itself. Retirement is not a termination event at all in New York; see the duration and modification sections below.
Changing it later
S. 236, Part B, subd. 9(b)(1), verbatim: 'Upon application by either party, the court may annul or modify any prior order or judgment made after trial as to maintenance, upon a showing of the payee's inability to be self-supporting or upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstance, including financial hardship or upon actual full or partial retirement of the payor if the retirement results in a substantial change in financial circumstances. Where, after the effective date of this part, an agreement remains in force, no modification of an order or judgment incorporating the terms of said agreement shall be made as to maintenance without a showing of extreme hardship on either party, in which event the judgment or order as modified shall supersede the terms of the prior agreement and judgment for such period of time and under such circumstances as the court determines. The court shall not reduce or annul any arrears of maintenance which have been reduced to final judgment pursuant to section two hundred forty-four of this article. No other arrears of maintenance which have accrued prior to the making of such application shall be subject to modification or annulment unless the defaulting party shows good cause for failure to make application for relief from the judgment or order directing such payment prior to the accrual of such arrears and the facts and circumstances constituting good cause are set forth in a written memorandum of decision. Such modification may increase maintenance nunc pro tunc as of the date of application based on newly discovered evidence.' Two thresholds, not one: 'substantial change in circumstance' for an order made after trial, and 'extreme hardship' where the order incorporates the parties' agreement. The 2015 guidelines are expressly not a change of circumstances for older orders. Subd. 6, para. k, verbatim: 'In any action or proceeding for modification of an order of maintenance or alimony existing prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand fifteen which amended this subdivision, brought pursuant to this article, the guidelines for post-divorce maintenance set forth in this subdivision shall not constitute a change of circumstances warranting modification of such support order.' Paragraph l says the same for pre-2015 agreements, and paragraphs m and n provide that the guideline paragraphs c, d and e 'shall not apply' in those proceedings at all.
Worth knowing about New York
Four things. First, the dollar figure most often quoted for New York is out of date twice over. The 2015 act said $175,000 adjusted from 31 January 2016; the statute as it now stands says $184,000 adjusted from 1 March 2020; and the operative number today is neither, because it is whatever the Office of Court Administration has since published. A page that hands you a New York income cap ought to name the Office of Court Administration notice it came from. This one gives you no figure at all, for exactly that reason. Second, the two guidelines are genuinely different rules that happen to share arithmetic. Subd. 5-a is temporary maintenance and stops when the action stops; subd. 6 is post-divorce maintenance and carries the advisory duration schedule. A sentence beginning 'New York's maintenance formula' is ambiguous between them. Third, the deviation machinery is unwaivable. Subd. 6, para. e(2) and para. f(2) both end 'Such decision shall not be waived by either party or counsel', which forecloses the ordinary practice of consenting to skip findings. Fourth, s. 248 preserves an element that reads as a survival from 1975: living with another person is not enough, the payee must also be 'holding himself or herself out as the spouse of such other person'. The 2015 act rewrote the section's gendered nouns without touching that element.
The tax rule changed, and most guides still describe the old one
For a divorce or separation instrument executed after 31 December 2018, alimony is not deductible by the person paying it and not taxable to the person receiving it. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act repealed the provisions that made it otherwise. For an instrument executed on or before that date the old treatment continues — deductible to the payer, taxable to the recipient — unless it is later modified and the modification expressly adopts the new rule.
This is not a detail. Under the old rule a higher-rate payer could transfer income to a lower-rate recipient and the two of them shared the saving. That saving no longer exists, which changes what a given number is worth to each side. New Hampshire wrote the point into its own statute: its 23 per cent figure assumes non-deductibility, and reverts to 30 per cent if the federal treatment is ever restored.
But that is only the federal rule, and New York is one of four states where it is not the end of the story. New York expressly declined to follow the federal change. On the New York return you subtract alimony paid and add back alimony received, regardless of when the instrument was executed. The state set this out in a technical memorandum within days of the federal law taking effect.
Why it matters: alimony that is invisible on the federal return still moves money on the state one. A settlement modeled on federal treatment alone is mispriced in New York. See how the four decoupled states differ.
Source: N.Y. Dept. of Taxation and Finance, Technical Memorandum TSB-M-18(6)I, “New York State Decouples from Certain Personal Income Tax Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Changes for 2018 and after” (Dec. 28, 2018) the state source
The other number that decides your budget
How New York calculates child support, and the overnight count that moves it more than income does.
And the question underneath it
What New York presumes about custody, and what the judge has to weigh.
The rest of what we have written about New York. Every figure is quoted from New York’s own statute or its courts’ own published schedule, and carries the date we last checked it.