Alimony · West Virginia · checked 23 Aug 2026

Alimony in West Virginia.

Whether the state sets a formula or leaves it to the judge, what the court has to weigh, how long it runs, and what brings it to an end.

Does West Virginia have an alimony formula?

No. The judge decides it on the factors.

There is no arithmetic in West Virginia’s statute. The court decides the amount and the length from the factors below, and two judges on the same facts can reach different answers. That is not a flaw in how we are describing it; it is how the law is written.

Use the state’s own words

West Virginia calls it 'Spousal support', and it is defined. W. Va. Code 48-1-242, quoted verbatim in full: '"Spousal support" means an allowance that a person may be ordered to pay for the support and maintenance of a spouse or a former spouse, while they are living separate and apart or after an order for divorce, annulment or separate maintenance.' The word 'alimony' does not carry the statutory meaning in West Virginia. 'Separate maintenance' is a companion phrase used throughout Article 6, as in the caption of 48-6-301: 'Factors considered in awarding spousal support and separate maintenance.'. Using the state’s own term matters when you are searching for forms or reading an order — the words are not interchangeable across state lines, and some of them mean different things in different places.

What the law actually says

The power the court has

What the judge has to weigh

W. Va. Code 48-6-301 (Factors considered in awarding spousal support and separate maintenance); 48-8-101 (General provisions regarding spousal support); 48-8-102 (Jurisdiction to award spousal support); 48-8-104 (Effect of fault or misconduct on award of spousal support); 48-8-105 (Rehabilitative spousal support); 48-1-242, 48-1-243 and 48-1-235.5 (definitions); 48-5-502 (Temporary spousal support); 48-5-602 (Court may require payment of spousal support); 48-5-701 (Revision of order concerning spousal support); 48-5-707 (Reduction or termination of spousal support because of de facto marriage); 48-6-201 to 48-6-203 (separation agreements). Section 48-6-301 was enacted by the 2001 Regular Session (Enrolled Committee Substitute for House Bill 2199) and amended by the 2018 Regular Session (Enrolled Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 51). — the factorsW. Va. Code 48-6-301, quoted verbatim in full, twenty factors: '(a) In cases where the parties to an action commenced under the provisions of this article have not executed a separation agreement, or have executed an agreement which is incomplete or insufficient to resolve the outstanding issues between the parties, or where the court finds the separation agreement of the parties not to be fair and reasonable or clear and unambiguous, the court shall proceed to resolve the issues outstanding between the parties. (b) The court shall consider the following factors in determining the amount and duration of spousal support and separate maintenance, if any, to be ordered under the provisions of parts V and VI, s.48-5-1 et seq. of this code as a supplement to or in lieu of the separation agreement: (1) The length of time the parties were married; (2) The period of time during the marriage when the parties actually lived together as husband and wife; (3) The present employment income and other recurring earnings of each party from any source; (4) The income-earning abilities of each of the parties, based upon such factors as educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children; (5) The distribution of marital property to be made under the terms of a separation agreement or by the court under the provisions of s.48-7-6 et seq. of this code, insofar as the distribution affects or will affect the earnings of the parties and their ability to pay or their need to receive spousal support and separate maintenance: Provided, That for the purposes of determining a spouse's ability to pay spousal support, the court may not consider the income generated by property allocated to the payor spouse in connection with the division of marital property unless the court makes specific findings that a failure to consider income from the allocated property would result in substantial inequity; (6) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional condition of each party; (7) The educational qualifications of each party; (8) Whether either party has foregone or postponed economic, education, or employment opportunities during the course of the marriage; (9) The standard of living established during the marriage; (10) The likelihood that the party seeking spousal support and separate maintenance can substantially increase his or her income-earning abilities within a reasonable time by acquiring additional education or training; (11) Any financial or other contribution made by either party to the education, training, vocational skills, career, or earning capacity of the other party; (12) The anticipated expense of obtaining the education and training described in s.48-6-301(b)(10) of this code; (13) The costs of educating minor children; (14) The costs of providing health care for each of the parties and their minor children; (15) The tax consequences to each party; (16) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because that party will be the custodian of a minor child or children, to seek employment outside the home; (17) The financial need of each party; (18) The legal obligations of each party to support himself or herself and to support any other person; (19) Costs and care associated with a minor or adult child's physical or mental disabilities; and (20) Any other factors as the court determines necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable grant of spousal support and separate maintenance.' Note what is not in this list: fault. It is dealt with separately, and mandatorily, by 48-8-104. Source: https://code.wvlegislature.gov/48-6-301/

How long it lasts

Duration

No bracket, no cap, no schedule. Section 48-6-301(b) directs the court to consider its twenty factors 'in determining the amount and duration of spousal support and separate maintenance', and the first two factors are the length of the marriage and 'The period of time during the marriage when the parties actually lived together as husband and wife' – but the statute supplies no number. Duration is instead built into the class of award. Rehabilitative spousal support is defined at W. Va. Code 48-1-235.5, quoted verbatim in full: '"Rehabilitative spousal support" means spousal support payable for a specific and determinable period of time, designed to cease when the payee is, after the exercise of reasonable efforts, in a position of self-support.' Spousal support in gross is defined at W. Va. Code 48-1-243, quoted verbatim in full: '"Spousal support in gross" means spousal support payable either in a lump sum, or in periodic payments of a definite amount over a specific period of time. A spousal support award is "spousal support in gross" only if the award grants spousal support in such terms that a determination can be made of the total amount to be paid as well as the time such payments will cease.' Rehabilitative support has its own section, 48-8-105(a), quoted verbatim: 'The court may award rehabilitative spousal support for a limited period of time to allow the recipient spouse, through reasonable efforts, to become gainfully employed. When awarding rehabilitative spousal support, the court shall make specific findings of fact to explain the basis for the award, giving due consideration to the factors set forth in s.48-6-301 of this code. An award of rehabilitative spousal support is appropriate when the dependent spouse evidences a potential for self-support that could be developed through rehabilitation, training, or academic study.'

Does behavior matter?

Marital misconduct

West Virginia is one of the states where fault matters, and it matters by an express, mandatory command in a section of its own. W. Va. Code 48-8-104, captioned 'Effect of fault or misconduct on award of spousal support', quoted verbatim in full – this is the entire section: 'In determining whether spousal support is to be awarded, or in determining the amount of spousal support, if any, to be awarded, the court shall consider and compare the fault or misconduct of either or both of the parties and the effect of the fault or misconduct as a contributing factor to the deterioration of the marital relationship.' Four things follow from the text. The verb is 'shall', not 'may' – the court has no discretion to leave fault out. The command reaches both the threshold question ('whether spousal support is to be awarded') and the quantum ('the amount of spousal support, if any'). It is comparative – the court must 'consider and compare' the fault 'of either or both of the parties', so this is a weighing of relative fault, not a bar triggered by one party's conduct. And the relevance test is causal: the effect of the fault 'as a contributing factor to the deterioration of the marital relationship.' Note also where the provision sits: fault is not one of the twenty factors in 48-6-301, which is the section usually reproduced as 'West Virginia's spousal support factors'. It is a separate section in a different article, and reading the factor list alone would miss it entirely. Source: https://code.wvlegislature.gov/48-8-104/

When it ends, and when it can change

What brings it to an end

West Virginia sets termination by class and by default rule, and the defaults differ. On death, W. Va. Code 48-6-202, quoted verbatim in relevant part: 'In the event neither an agreement nor an order makes provision for the death of the payor or payee, spousal support other than rehabilitative spousal support or spousal support in gross shall cease on the death of the payor or payee. In the event neither an agreement nor an order makes provision for the death of the payor, rehabilitative spousal support continues beyond the payor's death, in the absence of evidence that the payor's estate is likely to be insufficient to meet other obligations or that other matters would make continuation after death inequitable. Rehabilitative spousal support ceases with the payee's death. In the event neither an agreement nor an order makes provision for the death of the payor or payee, spousal support in gross continues beyond the payor's or payee's death.' On remarriage, W. Va. Code 48-6-203, quoted verbatim in relevant part: 'In the event neither an agreement nor an order makes provision for the remarriage of the payee, spousal support other than rehabilitative spousal support or spousal support in gross shall cease on the remarriage of the payee. Rehabilitative spousal support does not cease upon the remarriage of the payee during the first four years of a rehabilitative period. In the event neither an agreement nor an order makes provision for the remarriage of the payee, spousal support in gross continues beyond the payee's remarriage.' Cohabitation is dealt with under the heading 'de facto marriage', at W. Va. Code 48-5-707(a)(1) and (2), quoted verbatim: '(1) In the discretion of the court, an award of spousal support may be reduced or terminated upon specific written findings by the court that since the granting of a divorce and the award of spousal support a de facto marriage has existed between the spousal support payee and another person. (2) In determining whether an existing award of spousal support should be reduced or terminated because of an alleged de facto marriage between a payee and another person, the court should elicit the nature and extent of the relationship in question. The court should give consideration, without limitation, to circumstances such as the following in determining the relationship of an ex-spouse to another person: (A) The extent to which the ex-spouse and the other person have held themselves out as a married couple by engaging in conduct such as using the same last name, using a common mailing address, referring to each other in terms such as "my husband" or "my wife", or otherwise conducting themselves in a manner that evidences a stable marriage-like relationship; (B) The period of time that the ex-spouse has resided with another person not related by consanguinity or affinity in a permanent place of abode; (C) The duration and circumstances under which the ex-spouse has maintained a continuing conjugal relationship with the other person; (D) The extent to which the ex-spouse and the other person have pooled their assets or income or otherwise exhibited financial interdependence; (E) The extent to which the ex-spouse or the other person has supported the other, in whole or in part; (F) The extent to which the ex-spouse or the other person has performed valuable services for the other; (G) The extent to which the ex-spouse or the other person has performed valuable services for the other's company or employer; (H) Whether the ex-spouse and the other person have worked together to create or enhance anything of value; (I) Whether the ex-spouse and the other person have jointly contributed to the purchase of any real or personal property; (J) Evidence in support of a claim that the ex-spouse and the other person have an express agreement regarding property sharing or support; or (K) Evidence in support of a claim that the ex-spouse and the other person have an implied agreement regarding property sharing or support.' The burden and the limits follow, verbatim: '(3) On the issue of whether spousal support should be reduced or terminated under this subsection, the burden is on the payor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a de facto marriage exists. If the court finds that the payor has failed to meet burden of proof on the issue, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a payee who prevails in an action that sought to reduce or terminate spousal support on the ground that a de facto marriage exists. (4) The court shall order that a reduction or termination of spousal support is retroactive to the date of service of the petition on the payee, unless the court finds that reimbursement of amounts already paid would cause an undue hardship on the payee. (5) An award of rehabilitative spousal support shall not be reduced or terminated because of the existence of a de facto marriage between the spousal support payee and another person. (6) An award of spousal support in gross shall not be reduced or terminated because of the existence of a de facto marriage between the spousal support payee and another person. (7) An award of spousal support shall not be reduced or terminated under the provisions of this subsection for conduct by a spousal support payee that occurred before October 1, 1999.' Source: https://code.wvlegislature.gov/48-5-707/

Changing it later

The general power is at W. Va. Code 48-5-701, quoted verbatim in full – the entire section: 'After the entry of a final divorce order, the court may revise the order concerning spousal support or the maintenance of the parties and enter a new order concerning the same, as the circumstances of the parties may require.' No threshold of 'substantial change' is written into that section. The default that makes an award modifiable is at W. Va. Code 48-6-201(b), quoted verbatim in full: 'Any award of periodic payments of spousal support shall be deemed to be judicially decreed and subject to subsequent modification unless there is some explicit, well expressed, clear, plain and unambiguous provision to the contrary set forth in the court-approved separation agreement or the order granting the divorce. Child support shall, under all circumstances, always be subject to continuing judicial modification.' Rehabilitative support has its own modification rule, at 48-8-105(b), quoted verbatim: 'The court may modify an award of rehabilitative spousal support if a substantial change in the circumstances under which rehabilitative spousal support was granted warrants terminating, extending, or modifying the award or replacing it with an award of permanent spousal support. In determining whether a substantial change of circumstances exists which would warrant a modification of a rehabilitative spousal support award, the court may consider a reassessment of the dependent spouse's potential work skills and the availability of a relevant job market, the dependent spouse's age, health and skills, the dependent spouse's ability or inability to meet the terms of the rehabilitative plan and other relevant factors as provided for in s.48-6-301 of this code.' What the parties may contract about is spelled out at 48-6-201(a), which lists among the terms a separation agreement may fix 'whether a court shall have continuing jurisdiction over the amount of a spousal support award so as to increase or decrease the amount of spousal support to be paid' and 'whether an award of spousal support, other than an award of rehabilitative spousal support or spousal support in gross, may be reduced or terminated because a de facto marriage exists between the spousal support payee and another person'. Source: https://code.wvlegislature.gov/48-6-201/

Worth knowing about West Virginia

Four. First, and this is the one to get right: fault is mandatory in West Virginia, and it is not in the factor list. W. Va. Code 48-8-104 says the court 'shall consider and compare the fault or misconduct of either or both of the parties and the effect of the fault or misconduct as a contributing factor to the deterioration of the marital relationship.' Anyone who reproduces 48-6-301's twenty factors as 'the West Virginia factors' and stops there has left out a mandatory command that sits in a different article. Note too that the test is comparative and causal – relative fault, measured by its contribution to the deterioration of the marriage – not a bar triggered by adultery as such. Second, spousal support cannot be ordered at all unless the parties are living apart: 48-8-101(c), 'An award of spousal support cannot be ordered unless the parties are actually living separate and apart from each other.' Third, West Virginia calls cohabitation a 'de facto marriage', gives the court eleven named circumstances to weigh, puts the burden on the payer by a preponderance, exposes an unsuccessful payer to the payee's attorney's fees, and immunises two classes of award – rehabilitative support and support in gross – from the doctrine entirely. Fourth, the default rules on death and remarriage run the opposite way for different classes: ordinary spousal support ceases on the payee's remarriage, but rehabilitative spousal support 'does not cease upon the remarriage of the payee during the first four years of a rehabilitative period', and spousal support in gross continues beyond both the payee's remarriage and either party's death.

The tax rule changed, and most guides still describe the old one

For a divorce or separation instrument executed after 31 December 2018, alimony is not deductible by the person paying it and not taxable to the person receiving it. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act repealed the provisions that made it otherwise. For an instrument executed on or before that date the old treatment continues — deductible to the payer, taxable to the recipient — unless it is later modified and the modification expressly adopts the new rule.

This is not a detail. Under the old rule a higher-rate payer could transfer income to a lower-rate recipient and the two of them shared the saving. That saving no longer exists, which changes what a given number is worth to each side. New Hampshire wrote the point into its own statute: its 23 per cent figure assumes non-deductibility, and reverts to 30 per cent if the federal treatment is ever restored.

Alongside the federal rule, West Virginia’s own income tax follows the federal treatment. That means the federal answer above is the whole answer here — no state adjustment for alimony either way. Four states do not — Arkansas, California, New Jersey and New York — so this is worth knowing rather than assuming. The fifty-state table.
Source: W. Va. Code § 11-21-9(a): ‘All amendments made to the laws of the United States after December 31, 2024, but prior to January 1, 2026, shall be given effect in determining the taxes imposed by this article to the same extent those changes are allowed for federal income tax purposes… but no amendment to the laws of the United States made on or after January 1, 2026, may be given any effect.’ the state source

Authority: Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 115-97, section 11051, repealing Internal Revenue Code sections 71 and 215; see also IRS Publication 504.

Authority: W. Va. Code 48-6-301 (Factors considered in awarding spousal support and separate maintenance); 48-8-101 (General provisions regarding spousal support); 48-8-102 (Jurisdiction to award spousal support); 48-8-104 (Effect of fault or misconduct on award of spousal support); 48-8-105 (Rehabilitative spousal support); 48-1-242, 48-1-243 and 48-1-235.5 (definitions); 48-5-502 (Temporary spousal support); 48-5-602 (Court may require payment of spousal support); 48-5-701 (Revision of order concerning spousal support); 48-5-707 (Reduction or termination of spousal support because of de facto marriage); 48-6-201 to 48-6-203 (separation agreements). Section 48-6-301 was enacted by the 2001 Regular Session (Enrolled Committee Substitute for House Bill 2199) and amended by the 2018 Regular Session (Enrolled Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 51). — read it on West Virginia’s own site. Checked 23 Aug 2026.

The other number that decides your budget

How West Virginia calculates child support, and the overnight count that moves it more than income does.

Child support →

And the question underneath it

What West Virginia presumes about custody, and what the judge has to weigh.

Custody →

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Sources last checked23 August 2026

Page published23 August 2026

What this means. This is when the sources on this page were last read against their originals — statutes, court rules, official schedules — taken from the dates recorded against the individual citations on this page. It is not the date the page was last edited. Adding a link or fixing a typo does not move it; re-reading the statute does. Where we get something wrong we publish it at thecusp.app/corrections with the date, what changed, and how long the error was live.