Alimony in New Jersey.
Whether the state sets a formula or leaves it to the judge, what the court has to weigh, how long it runs, and what brings it to an end.
See a different stateNew Jersey
There is no arithmetic in New Jersey’s statute. The court decides the amount and the length from the factors below, and two judges on the same facts can reach different answers. That is not a flaw in how we are describing it; it is how the law is written.
Use the state’s own words
New Jersey calls it alimony, in four statutory kinds: open durational alimony, rehabilitative alimony, limited duration alimony and reimbursement alimony. 'Permanent alimony' was abolished in 2014 and the substitution is visible on the face of the amending act, which shows '[permanent]' struck and 'open durational' inserted. 'Maintenance' appears in the statute only in the alternative phrase 'alimony and maintenance' and in the factor language 'the party seeking maintenance'.. Using the state’s own term matters when you are searching for forms or reading an order — the words are not interchangeable across state lines, and some of them mean different things in different places. 'Permanent alimony' was replaced by 'open durational alimony' by L.2014, c.42.
What the law actually says
The power the court has
What the judge has to weigh
How long it lasts
Duration
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c), verbatim: 'For any marriage or civil union less than 20 years in duration, the total duration of alimony shall not, except in exceptional circumstances, exceed the length of the marriage or civil union. Determination of the length and amount of alimony shall be made by the court pursuant to consideration of all of the statutory factors set forth in subsection b. of this section. In addition to those factors, the court shall also consider the practical impact of the parties' need for separate residences and the attendant increase in living expenses on the ability of both parties to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to the standard of living established in the marriage or civil union, to which both parties are entitled, with neither party having a greater entitlement thereto. Exceptional circumstances which may require an adjustment to the duration of alimony include: (1) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and at the time of the alimony award; (2) The degree and duration of the dependency of one party on the other party during the marriage or civil union; (3) Whether a spouse or partner has a chronic illness or unusual health circumstance; (4) Whether a spouse or partner has given up a career or a career opportunity or otherwise supported the career of the other spouse or partner; (5) Whether a spouse or partner has received a disproportionate share of equitable distribution; (6) The impact of the marriage or civil union on either party's ability to become self-supporting, including but not limited to either party's responsibility as primary caretaker of a child; (7) Tax considerations of either party; (8) Any other factors or circumstances that the court deems equitable, relevant and material.' Two points the summaries usually miss. The cap is on the total duration of alimony of any kind, not merely on limited duration alimony. And there is no cap at all for a marriage or civil union of twenty years or more; for those, open durational alimony remains available and the section states no outside limit. Limited duration alimony carries its own rule, verbatim: 'An award of alimony for a limited duration may be modified based either upon changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the award. The court may modify the amount of such an award, but shall not modify the length of the term except in unusual circumstances. In determining the length of the term, the court shall consider the length of time it would reasonably take for the recipient to improve his or her earning capacity to a level where limited duration alimony is no longer appropriate.' Source: https://njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A1000/845_U1.HTM
Does behavior matter?
Marital misconduct
There is no general marital-fault factor. Marital misconduct does not appear among the fourteen factors in subsection b., and there is no provision barring or mandating alimony on the ground of adultery. Two narrower provisions carry conduct into the analysis. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(g), verbatim: 'In all actions for divorce or dissolution other than those where judgment is granted solely on the ground of separation the court may consider also the proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of alimony or maintenance that is fit, reasonable and just. In all actions for divorce, dissolution of civil union, divorce from bed and board, or legal separation from a partner in a civil union couple where judgment is granted on the ground of institutionalization for mental illness the court may consider the possible burden upon the taxpayers of the State as well as the ability of the party to pay in determining an amount of maintenance to be awarded.' That is permissive, is tied to the proofs that established the ground actually pleaded, and is switched off where the ground is separation. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(i) is a hard bar, verbatim: 'No person convicted of Murder, N.J.S.2C:11-3; Manslaughter, N.J.S.2C:11-4; Criminal Homicide, N.J.S.2C:11-2; Aggravated Assault, under subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1; or a substantially similar offense under the laws of another jurisdiction, may receive alimony if: (1) the crime results in death or serious bodily injury, as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:11-1, to a family member of a divorcing party; and (2) the crime was committed after the marriage or civil union. A person convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder may not receive alimony from the person who was the intended victim of the attempt or conspiracy. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to deny alimony for other bad acts.' The closing sentence is the one to read twice: it preserves, without defining, an authority to deny alimony 'for other bad acts'. Source: https://njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A1000/845_U1.HTM
When it ends, and when it can change
What brings it to an end
Retirement, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1), verbatim: 'There shall be a rebuttable presumption that alimony shall terminate upon the obligor spouse or partner attaining full retirement age, except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the termination date shall not be vacated or annulled. The court may set a different alimony termination date for good cause shown based on specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The rebuttable presumption may be overcome if, upon consideration of the following factors and for good cause shown, the court determines that alimony should continue: (a) The ages of the parties at the time of the application for retirement; (b) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and their ages at the time of entry of the alimony award; (c) The degree and duration of the economic dependency of the recipient upon the payor during the marriage or civil union; (d) Whether the recipient has foregone or relinquished or otherwise sacrificed claims, rights or property in exchange for a more substantial or longer alimony award; (e) The duration or amount of alimony already paid; (f) The health of the parties at the time of the retirement application; (g) Assets of the parties at the time of the retirement application; (h) Whether the recipient has reached full retirement age as defined in this section; (i) Sources of income, both earned and unearned, of the parties; (j) The ability of the recipient to have saved adequately for retirement; and (k) Any other factors that the court may deem relevant.' 'Full retirement age' is defined in the same section as 'the age at which a person is eligible to receive full retirement for full retirement benefits under section 216 of the federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. s.416).' Early retirement shifts the burden, subsection j.(2): 'Where the obligor seeks to retire prior to attaining the full retirement age as defined in this section, the obligor shall have the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the prospective or actual retirement is reasonable and made in good faith', assessed on eight enumerated factors. For pre-2014 orders, subsection j.(3) provides that 'the obligor's reaching full retirement age as defined in this section shall be deemed a good faith retirement age'. Subsection j.(4): 'The assets distributed between the parties at the time of the entry of a final order of divorce or dissolution of a civil union shall not be considered by the court for purposes of determining the obligor's ability to pay alimony following retirement.' Cohabitation, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n), verbatim: 'Alimony may be suspended or terminated if the payee cohabits with another person. Cohabitation involves a mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage or civil union but does not necessarily maintain a single common household. When assessing whether cohabitation is occurring, the court shall consider the following: (1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or liabilities; (2) Sharing or joint responsibility for living expenses; (3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple's social and family circle; (4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a mutually supportive intimate personal relationship; (5) Sharing household chores; (6) Whether the recipient of alimony has received an enforceable promise of support from another person within the meaning of subsection h. of R.S.25:1-5; and (7) All other relevant evidence. In evaluating whether cohabitation is occurring and whether alimony should be suspended or terminated, the court shall also consider the length of the relationship. A court may not find an absence of cohabitation solely on grounds that the couple does not live together on a full-time basis.' Remarriage and death are not in section 2A:34-23 at all. They are in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25, captioned 'Termination of alimony', as amended by L.1999, c.199, s.2, verbatim: 'If after the judgment of divorce a former spouse shall remarry, permanent and limited duration alimony shall terminate as of the date of remarriage except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of remarriage shall not be vacated or annulled. A former spouse who remarries shall promptly so inform the spouse paying permanent or limited duration alimony as well as the collecting agency, if any. The court may order such alimony recipient who fails to comply with the notification provision of this act to pay any reasonable attorney fees and court costs incurred by the recipient's former spouse as a result of such non-compliance. The remarriage of a former spouse receiving rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony shall not be cause for termination of such alimony by the court unless the court finds that the circumstances upon which the award was based have not occurred or unless the payer spouse demonstrates an agreement or good cause to the contrary. Alimony shall terminate upon the death of the payer spouse, except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of the payer spouse's death shall not be vacated or annulled. Nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit a court from ordering either spouse to maintain life insurance for the protection of the former spouse or the children of the marriage in the event of the payer spouse's death.' Three things follow from the words as enacted. Remarriage terminates permanent and limited duration alimony automatically and by date, not by motion. Remarriage does not terminate rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony except on one of the two stated findings. And the death provision names only the payer spouse; the section says nothing about the death of the recipient. Sources: https://njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A1000/845_U1.HTM and https://pub.njleg.gov/bills/9899/PL99/199_.PDF
Changing it later
There is no single modification standard. Subsection b.'s types carry different rules, and subsections k. and l. then supply the machinery. Reimbursement alimony is fixed: subsection e., 'An award of reimbursement alimony shall not be modified for any reason.' Limited duration alimony may be modified in amount 'based either upon changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the award', but the court 'shall not modify the length of the term except in unusual circumstances' (subsection c.). Rehabilitative alimony uses the same changed-circumstances-or-nonoccurrence test (subsection d.). Subsection d. also states, verbatim: 'This section is not intended to preclude a court from modifying [permanent] alimony awards based upon the law.' For a non-self-employed obligor, subsection k. supplies ten factors, verbatim: '(1) The reasons for any loss of income; (2) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, the obligor's documented efforts to obtain replacement employment or to pursue an alternative occupation; (3) Under circumstances where there has been a loss of employment, whether the obligor is making a good faith effort to find remunerative employment at any level and in any field; (4) The income of the obligee; the obligee's circumstances; and the obligee's reasonable efforts to obtain employment in view of those circumstances and existing opportunities; (5) The impact of the parties' health on their ability to obtain employment; (6) Any severance compensation or award made in connection with any loss of employment; (7) Any changes in the respective financial circumstances of the parties that have occurred since the date of the order from which modification is sought; (8) The reasons for any change in either party's financial circumstances since the date of the order from which modification is sought, including, but not limited to, assessment of the extent to which either party's financial circumstances at the time of the application are attributable to enhanced earnings or financial benefits received from any source since the date of the order; (9) Whether a temporary remedy should be fashioned to provide adjustment of the support award from which modification is sought, and the terms of any such adjustment, pending continuing employment investigations by the unemployed spouse or partner; and (10) Any other factor the court deems relevant to fairly and equitably decide the application.' And a hard waiting period, verbatim: 'Under circumstances where the changed circumstances arise from the loss of employment, the length of time a party has been involuntarily unemployed or has had an involuntary reduction in income shall not be the only factor considered by the court when an application is filed by a non-self-employed party to reduce alimony because of involuntary loss of employment. The court shall determine the application based upon all of the enumerated factors, however, no application shall be filed until a party has been unemployed, or has not been able to return to or attain employment at prior income levels, or both, for a period of 90 days. The court shall have discretion to make any relief granted retroactive to the date of the loss of employment or reduction of income.' For a self-employed obligor, subsection l., verbatim: 'When a self-employed party seeks modification of alimony because of an involuntary reduction in income since the date of the order from which modification is sought, then that party's application for relief must include an analysis that sets forth the economic and non-economic benefits the party receives from the business, and which compares these economic and non-economic benefits to those that were in existence at the time of the entry of the order.' Subsection m., verbatim: 'When assessing a temporary remedy, the court may temporarily suspend support, or reduce support on terms; direct that support be paid in some amount from assets pending further proceedings; direct a periodic review; or enter any other order the court finds appropriate to assure fairness and equity to both parties.' Source: https://njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A1000/845_U1.HTM
Worth knowing about New Jersey
Five things. First, the 2014 act left a dead word standing in the neighboring section. L.2014, c.42 is titled 'AN ACT concerning alimony and amending N.J.S.2A:34-23' and, on the face of the chapter law, it amended that section and no other. So 'permanent alimony' was struck from 2A:34-23 and replaced by 'open durational alimony', while 2A:34-25, the termination section, still reads 'permanent and limited duration alimony shall terminate as of the date of remarriage'. New Jersey's termination-on-remarriage rule is written in a vocabulary its award statute abandoned in 2014, and nothing in either section says that 'open durational' is to be read for 'permanent'. Second, the ninety-day rule in subsection k. is a statutory waiting period on the courthouse door, not a standard of proof: 'no application shall be filed until a party has been unemployed, or has not been able to return to or attain employment at prior income levels, or both, for a period of 90 days.' A New Jersey payor who loses a job in January cannot file until April, though relief may then be made retroactive to the date of the loss. Third, the cohabitation definition expressly decouples cohabitation from living together. The section says the relationship 'does not necessarily maintain a single common household' and then, for the avoidance of doubt, that 'A court may not find an absence of cohabitation solely on grounds that the couple does not live together on a full-time basis.' Fourth, the anti-hierarchy rule in subsection b. forbids the court from weighting one factor above another without written findings saying why, which is close to the opposite of the ordinary judicial practice of identifying a dominant factor. Fifth, L.2014, c.42 is expressly non-retroactive as to duration and bargained terms: section 2 of the act provides that it 'shall not be construed either to modify the duration of alimony ordered or agreed upon or other specifically bargained for contractual provisions that have been incorporated into: a. a final judgment of divorce or dissolution; b. a final order that has concluded post-judgment litigation; or c. any enforceable written agreement between the parties.' A New Jersey judgment awarding permanent alimony before 2014 keeps its duration.
The tax rule changed, and most guides still describe the old one
For a divorce or separation instrument executed after 31 December 2018, alimony is not deductible by the person paying it and not taxable to the person receiving it. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act repealed the provisions that made it otherwise. For an instrument executed on or before that date the old treatment continues — deductible to the payer, taxable to the recipient — unless it is later modified and the modification expressly adopts the new rule.
This is not a detail. Under the old rule a higher-rate payer could transfer income to a lower-rate recipient and the two of them shared the saving. That saving no longer exists, which changes what a given number is worth to each side. New Hampshire wrote the point into its own statute: its 23 per cent figure assumes non-deductibility, and reverts to 30 per cent if the federal treatment is ever restored.
But that is only the federal rule, and New Jersey is one of four states where it is not the end of the story. New Jersey was never coupled to the federal rule in the first place. Its Gross Income Tax Act does not build on federal adjusted gross income — it defines income through its own closed list of categories, under which alimony is taxable to the recipient and deductible to the payer. The federal repeal simply never reached New Jersey’s provisions.
Why it matters: alimony that is invisible on the federal return still moves money on the state one. A settlement modeled on federal treatment alone is mispriced in New Jersey. See how the four decoupled states differ.
Source: N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1(n) (income inclusion) and N.J.S.A. 54A:3-2 (payor deduction), New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act the state source
How far we got, and where we stopped
New Jersey publishes its bills and its enacted Acts as plain readable pages, but its consolidated statutes sit behind an application shell that serves a frameset rather than text. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 was read instead from the Legislature’s own enacted text of P.L.2014, c.42 — the Act that rewrote the section, and which sets it out in full. We searched the Legislature’s published Acts for a later amendment and found none, but that is a negative from searching the Acts rather than from reading a consolidated copy.
What that means for you: the words above are reliable — every quoted passage came from a source we name and link. What we cannot vouch for is that nothing has changed since, or that the subsection numbering matches what a subscription service would show. If you are citing a section in a filing, check the number against a law library copy. Quote the words with confidence.
The other number that decides your budget
How New Jersey calculates child support, and the overnight count that moves it more than income does.
And the question underneath it
What New Jersey presumes about custody, and what the judge has to weigh.
The rest of what we have written about New Jersey. Every figure is quoted from New Jersey’s own statute or its courts’ own published schedule, and carries the date we last checked it.