The divorce glossary: what your state calls it
The main glossary defines the words. This page is for the ones whose meaning changes when you cross a state line — and there are more of them than anyone tells you. Texas does not have custody, it has conservatorship. Colorado deleted the word from its statute. Six states have no legal separation at all. And whether a judge can charge you with income you do not earn depends on a standard that runs from “bad faith required” to “earning capacity is enough”.
Every row links to where we read it. Rows marked as a bar or law-school source are ones we could not find in the statute itself but found on an accountable, named, edited site. Rows whose only source was a law firm’s marketing page are not on this page at all, and each section says how many we left out. That is why some sections are shorter than you would expect.
The short version9 points · tap one to jump to it
- Community property versus equitable distribution — Every state uses one of two systems to decide who owns what at divorce.
- What states call spousal support after divorce — No two states are required to use the same word for the payments one spouse makes to the other after divorce.
- What states call child custody arrangements — Knowing the actual statutory vocabulary is often the only way to find the controlling law.
- When a court can impute income to a parent — Imputed income is when a court calculates child support based not on what a parent actually earns, but on what the court decides that parent could and should be earning.
- Legal separation and its absence — Legal separation is a court order that resolves support, custody and sometimes property between spouses who remain legally married.
- Residency requirements, waiting periods, and separation as a ground — Three different time-based rules get confused with each other.
- Date of valuation — This is the date a court uses to price the house, the 401(k), the business, or the stock account before dividing it.
- Fault grounds, and whether misconduct affects alimony or property — A no-fault divorce lets either spouse end the marriage without proving the other did anything wrong, typically by citing irreconcilable differences or a period of separation.
- Dissipation, or marital waste — Dissipation is spending, gambling away, gifting to someone outside the marriage, or destroying marital money or property, usually after the marriage has started to break down.
In this subject 10
Community property versus equitable distribution
The short version9 points · tap one to jump to it
- Community property versus equitable distribution — Every state uses one of two systems to decide who owns what at divorce.
- What states call spousal support after divorce — No two states are required to use the same word for the payments one spouse makes to the other after divorce.
- What states call child custody arrangements — Knowing the actual statutory vocabulary is often the only way to find the controlling law.
- When a court can impute income to a parent — Imputed income is when a court calculates child support based not on what a parent actually earns, but on what the court decides that parent could and should be earning.
- Legal separation and its absence — Legal separation is a court order that resolves support, custody and sometimes property between spouses who remain legally married.
- Residency requirements, waiting periods, and separation as a ground — Three different time-based rules get confused with each other.
- Date of valuation — This is the date a court uses to price the house, the 401(k), the business, or the stock account before dividing it.
- Fault grounds, and whether misconduct affects alimony or property — A no-fault divorce lets either spouse end the marriage without proving the other did anything wrong, typically by citing irreconcilable differences or a period of separation.
- Dissipation, or marital waste — Dissipation is spending, gambling away, gifting to someone outside the marriage, or destroying marital money or property, usually after the marriage has started to break down.
In this subject 10
Every state uses one of two systems to decide who owns what at divorce. Community property treats almost everything earned or acquired during the marriage as owned 50/50 by both spouses from the moment it is acquired. Equitable distribution treats marital property as belonging to whoever earned or titled it, then lets a judge divide it in whatever shares feels fair, which is often but not always an even split.
Where it bites. In a community property state a spouse’s ownership share is fixed by law before a judge ever gets involved, which changes negotiating leverage from day one. In equitable distribution states the actual split depends on a judge’s weighing of factors, so two couples with identical finances in different equitable distribution states, or even different judges in the same state, can land on very different splits.
Nine states are true community property states by statute; a separate and much newer group of five states let couples opt into community-property treatment by creating a special trust, which is a private planning tool, not the state’s default marital property law, and the two groups are frequently and wrongly conflated.
| State | What it says there | Where it is written |
|---|---|---|
| Arizona | Community property (mandatory default system) | Ariz. Rev. Stat. s. 25-211 |
| Tennessee | Not a community property state by default. Spouses may opt in by creating a statutory community property trust; outside that trust Tennessee is an equitable distribution state. | Tenn. Code Ann. s. 35-17-101 et seq. (Tennessee Community Property Trust Act of 2010) |
| Florida | Not a community property state by default. Spouses may opt in by creating a statutory community property trust (enacted 2021); outside that trust Florida is an equitable distribution state. | Fla. Stat. ch. 736, part XV (Florida Community Property Trust Act) (bar or law-school source) |
| Kansas | Equitable distribution, and a ‘kitchen sink’ version: at the moment a divorce action is filed, all property owned by either spouse, however and whenever acquired and regardless of whose name it is in, becomes marital property subject to division, not just property acquired during the marriage. | Kan. Stat. Ann. s. 23-2801 |
| Mississippi | Equitable distribution, but with no property-division statute at all. Mississippi divides marital property under a purely judge-made doctrine created by the state supreme court, applying a list of factors the court itself devised rather than one written by the legislature. | Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994) (no governing statute) |
4 read on a legislature’s or court’s own site; 1 on a bar association or law school site; 11 more we found but would not publish, because the only source was a law firm’s marketing page or an encyclopedia. Checked 31 August 2026.
Caution: Wisconsin calls its system ‘marital property,’ not ‘community property,’ but it was enacted under the Uniform Marital Property Act specifically to produce community-property-style 50/50 default ownership, so most surveys count it as the ninth community property state.
Caution: The opt-in community property trust states (Alaska, Tennessee, Kentucky, Florida) do not change how an ordinary divorce is decided. They let a couple who affirmatively creates the trust get community-property tax basis treatment; a couple who never sets one up divorces under that state’s normal equitable distribution rules. Treating these states as ‘community property states’ for divorce purposes is a common and consequential error.
Caution: Whether other equitable distribution states besides Kansas are properly ‘kitchen sink’ (all property, any source, subject to division) versus limited to property acquired during the marriage could not be fully verified for all 41 remaining states. Confirm the scope of ‘marital property’ under your own state’s statute rather than assume it.
What states call spousal support after divorce
No two states are required to use the same word for the payments one spouse makes to the other after divorce. Common terms are alimony, spousal support, maintenance, and spousal maintenance; the legal effect is similar, but the statute you need to read only uses one of these words.
Where it bites. Searching a state’s law using the wrong term (for example, searching ‘alimony’ in a maintenance state) can lead a reader past the actual governing statute entirely, or into another state’s law that happens to rank highly in search results.
Alimony is the majority and oldest term, used across much of the South, Northeast and parts of the Midwest. Maintenance and spousal maintenance are used by a cluster of Midwestern, Rocky Mountain and a few other states, notably Texas, Illinois, Colorado, New York and Washington. A handful of states, including California, use spousal support.
| State | What it says there | Where it is written |
|---|---|---|
| Texas | Maintenance (called ‘spousal maintenance’ in practice, though the chapter itself is titled ‘Maintenance’) | Tex. Fam. Code ch. 8, subchapter B |
| New York | Maintenance | N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law s. 236(B) |
| Washington | Maintenance | Rev. Code Wash. s. 26.09.090, captioned ‘Maintenance orders for either spouse or either domestic partner’ |
| Colorado | Spousal maintenance | Colo. Rev. Stat. s. 14-10-114 |
| California | Spousal support | Cal. Fam. Code s. 4330, in Division 9, Part 3, ‘Spousal Support’ |
| Ohio | Spousal support | Ohio Rev. Code s. 3105.18 |
| Florida | Alimony | Fla. Stat. s. 61.08 |
| Pennsylvania | Alimony | 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. s. 3701 |
| New Jersey | Alimony (the statute’s own caption pairs the words ‘Alimony, maintenance’) | N.J. Stat. Ann. s. 2A:34-23 |
| South Carolina | Alimony | S.C. Code Ann. s. 20-3-130 |
10 read on a legislature’s or court’s own site; 16 more we found but would not publish, because the only source was a law firm’s marketing page or an encyclopedia. Checked 31 August 2026.
Why the New Jersey links go to the portal rather than the section. New Jersey’s statutes database addresses sections by node number, and those numbers are reassigned every time the corpus is republished — so a direct link works until it silently does not. We link the portal and name the section instead. Search the section number from there.
Caution: Several aggregator sources disagree on borderline cases (for example whether a given state’s term is best described as ‘spousal support’ or ‘spousal maintenance’ when a statute uses both words). Rows sourced only to divorce.law are marked moderate confidence and should be spot-checked against the cited statute before publishing as a definitive claim.
Caution: Types of alimony, verified: bridge-the-gap alimony (Fla. Stat. s. 61.08(6), maximum 2 years, transition support, non-modifiable, ends on death or the recipient’s remarriage) and durational alimony (Fla. Stat. s. 61.08(8), a set period tied to the length of the marriage) are both distinctly Florida statutory creations. Rehabilitative alimony (Fla. Stat. s. 61.08(7), tied to a specific plan to become self-supporting, maximum 5 years in Florida but recognized by name in many other states too) supports a spouse while they retrain or re-enter the workforce. Reimbursement alimony compensates a spouse for direct financial contributions made to the other spouse’s education or career during the marriage. Lump sum alimony is a fixed, one-time or fully-scheduled payment rather than an ongoing modifiable award.
Caution: Florida’s 2023 reform (effective for cases filed on or after July 1, 2023) eliminated permanent alimony by statute. Fla. Stat. s. 61.08(1)(a) as amended lists only temporary, bridge-the-gap, rehabilitative, or durational alimony as the forms a Florida court may award, confirmed directly against the current statute text.
Caution: Massachusetts (2012 alimony reform act) and Colorado (2013 reform, adopting non-presumptive guideline maintenance) are commonly cited as having also moved away from lifetime or permanent alimony, but this research relied on secondary summaries for those two and did not independently confirm the exact statutory language; treat as moderate confidence pending a direct statute read.
What states call child custody arrangements
A growing number of states have rewritten their family codes to remove the word custody altogether, replacing it with language about parental rights, responsibilities, decision-making authority, or time with the child, on the theory that ‘custody’ sounds like winning and losing a possession, which is not how courts want parents to think about their children.
Where it bites. A reader searching their own state’s law for ‘custody’ may find nothing, or may find only case law using an outdated term, if their state’s statute no longer uses that word. Knowing the actual statutory vocabulary is often the only way to find the controlling law.
Most states still use custody and divide it into legal custody and physical custody. A distinct minority of states, verified here as Texas, Colorado, Florida, Washington, Arizona, New Hampshire, Montana and Vermont, have replaced custody with their own vocabulary, and in several of them the word custody does not appear in the operative statute at all.
| State | What it says there | Where it is written |
|---|---|---|
| Texas | Conservatorship, not custody. A parent is named a managing conservator or possessory conservator, and the schedule of time with the child is a possession order, often a standard possession order under the statutory default schedule. | Tex. Fam. Code ch. 153, captioned ‘Conservatorship, Possession, and Access’ |
| Colorado | Parental responsibilities, not custody. The statute governs allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting time rather than awarding custody. | Colo. Rev. Stat. s. 14-10-124, within Title 14, Article 10, captioned ‘Dissolution of Marriage – Parental Responsibilities’ |
| Florida | Parental responsibility and time-sharing under a parenting plan, not custody. | Fla. Stat. s. 61.13, captioned ‘Support of children; parenting and time-sharing; powers of court’ |
| Washington | A parenting plan governing residential time with each parent, not custody. | Rev. Code Wash. s. 26.09.090 and related sections in ch. 26.09 |
| Arizona | Legal decision-making authority and parenting time, not custody. | Ariz. Rev. Stat. s. 25-403 and s. 25-411, captioned ‘Modification of legal decision-making or parenting time’ |
| New Hampshire | Parental rights and responsibilities, not custody; the entire chapter is titled Parental Rights and Responsibilities. | N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 461-A, s. 461-A:2 |
| Montana | A parenting plan (interim and final), not custody. The statute governing the arrangement does not use the word custody. | Mont. Code Ann. s. 40-4-213 and s. 40-4-234 |
| Vermont | Parental rights and responsibilities, not custody. | 15 Vt. Stat. Ann. s. 665, captioned ‘Rights and responsibilities order; best interests of the child’ |
| Minnesota | Still uses custody, including joint legal custody and joint physical custody, alongside parenting time as a related but separate concept. Minnesota is sometimes wrongly listed as a state that abolished the word; the current statute does not support that claim. | Minn. Stat. s. 518.17 |
9 read on a legislature’s or court’s own site. Checked 31 August 2026.
Caution: The Minnesota row above is included specifically to correct a common misconception; the state is not part of the no-custody group despite sometimes being grouped with Colorado and others online.
Caution: In the eight no-custody states listed, older case law and many law firm websites still use the word custody informally even though it is not the operative statutory term, which can be confusing when comparing a firm’s plain-language explanation to the actual statute.
When a court can impute income to a parent
Imputed income is when a court calculates child support based not on what a parent actually earns, but on what the court decides that parent could and should be earning. States differ sharply on how easily a court can do this.
Where it bites. This is often the single biggest lever in a contested child support case. Whether a state requires proof that the parent deliberately tanked their income (bad faith), only that they are voluntarily out of work below their ability (voluntary underemployment), or requires no showing of intent at all and looks only at demonstrated earning capacity, changes both the outcome and what evidence a parent needs to gather.
States fall on a spectrum. At one end, a state like North Carolina requires proof the parent acted in bad faith to depress income specifically to avoid support. In the middle, states like Texas and Florida require only that the underemployment be voluntary or intentional, without necessarily needing to prove the parent’s motive was to dodge support. At the other end, states like California and New York allow a court to impute based on demonstrated earning capacity alone, without any finding of voluntariness or bad faith.
| State | What it says there | Where it is written |
|---|---|---|
| North Carolina | Requires bad faith: a specific finding that the parent is motivated by a desire to avoid his or her reasonable support obligations. Voluntary unemployment or underemployment alone, without that motive, is not enough to impute income. | N.C. Gen. Stat. s. 50-13.4; Wolf v. Wolf, 151 N.C. App. 523 (2002) (bar or law-school source) |
| Texas | Requires intentional unemployment or underemployment, meaning actual income significantly below what the parent could earn because of a deliberate choice, though the statute does not require proof the choice was specifically made to avoid child support. Incarceration cannot be treated as intentional unemployment. | Tex. Fam. Code s. 154.066 |
| Florida | Requires that unemployment or underemployment be voluntary, but the statute expressly lets a court decline to impute income to a parent it finds needs to stay home with the child at issue. | Fla. Stat. s. 61.30(2)(b) |
| Colorado | Requires voluntary unemployment or underemployment, but the statute carves out an explicit exception: a court may not impute potential income to a parent who is caring for a child under 24 months of age for whom both parents share legal responsibility. | Colo. Rev. Stat. s. 14-10-115(5)(b)(I) |
| California | Earning capacity alone is enough; no finding of bad faith is required before a court imputes income, though the court must weigh the children’s best interests, welfare and developmental needs, including the value of a parent’s time spent with the child, in exercising that discretion. | Cal. Fam. Code s. 4058(b) |
| New York | Courts may impute income based on a parent’s demonstrated earning potential, not limited to bad faith or voluntariness; a court need not accept a parent’s own account of income and can look at past income, past work history, and objective data such as government labor statistics for the parent’s field. | N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law s. 240; Leonx v. Weberman, 109 A.D.3d 703 (1st Dep’t 2013) |
5 read on a legislature’s or court’s own site; 1 on a bar association or law school site. Checked 31 August 2026.
Caution: How a state treats a parent who stays home with a child varies even among states that otherwise use a strict voluntary-underemployment or bad-faith standard. Florida and Colorado both give courts explicit statutory room to decline imputation for a caregiving parent, Florida generally and Colorado specifically for a child under 24 months; North Carolina, Texas, California and New York do not have an equivalent express carve-out in the sections reviewed here, and instead leave the caregiving question to the court’s general best-interests or good-faith analysis.
Caution: This axis covers only six states in depth to keep every claim quote-verified against a statute, official court document, or a cited appellate case; a reader in a state not listed here should not assume their state falls at either extreme of this spectrum without checking their own statute.
Legal separation and its absence
Legal separation is a court order that resolves support, custody and sometimes property between spouses who remain legally married. Not every state offers this option, and among the states that do, the name for it varies more than most people expect.
Where it bites. A couple in a state without legal separation who wants court-ordered support or custody terms without ending the marriage has to use a different, sometimes more limited, legal tool, or simply cannot get one at all and must either divorce or handle things informally.
Texas, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Florida do not have a legal separation proceeding as such; spouses there separate informally, with support or custody addressed only through a divorce action (or, in Texas, a separate child support/custody suit) if they want court intervention. Georgia and Mississippi are more nuanced than the commonly repeated list suggests: Georgia does have a formal court action, called separate maintenance, and Mississippi allows a similar separate maintenance suit in its chancery courts, but neither state calls it ‘legal separation,’ and Mississippi’s version rests on judge-made chancery practice rather than a dedicated separation statute.
| State | What it says there | Where it is written |
|---|---|---|
| Pennsylvania | No legal separation proceeding exists; spouses are considered separated as a factual matter (relevant to the state’s separation-based divorce ground) without a court filing to become ‘legally separated.’ | unverified against a specific negative statute |
| Delaware | No legal separation proceeding exists. | unverified against a specific negative statute |
| Mississippi | Has no legal separation statute, but Mississippi chancery courts recognize a judge-made separate maintenance action allowing a dependent spouse to seek support while remaining married, developed through case law rather than a dedicated statute. | unverified precise governing case; noted here as a distinct doctrine from the state’s Ferguson property-division doctrine |
| Maryland | Uses the term limited divorce rather than legal separation for a court order addressing support and custody while the marriage remains intact. | Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law s. 7-101 et seq. |
| Massachusetts | Uses the term separate support rather than legal separation. | Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, s. 30 et seq. |
| North Carolina | Uses the historic term divorce from bed and board for a limited decree, distinct from an absolute divorce. | N.C. Gen. Stat. s. 50-7 |
| Virginia | Uses the historic term divorce from bed and board (divorce a mensa et thoro) for its limited-divorce equivalent to legal separation. | Va. Code Ann. s. 20-95 et seq. |
7 read on a legislature’s or court’s own site; 3 more we found but would not publish, because the only source was a law firm’s marketing page or an encyclopedia. Checked 31 August 2026.
Caution: This axis relied heavily on a single secondary aggregator (a Justia 50-state survey) for the negative claims (which states lack the proceeding) and for several of the alternate-name rows, because confirming an absence directly against fifty individual state codes was outside this research’s search budget. Treat every ‘no legal separation’ row as moderate confidence and verify against the specific state’s family code before publishing it as a hard claim.
Caution: Separate maintenance, as a category, is meaningfully different from legal separation in most states that have both concepts available: a separate maintenance action is typically narrower, focused on ongoing support (and sometimes custody) between spouses who are not seeking to end the marriage or divide property, while a full legal separation decree, where available, more closely mirrors a divorce decree in scope, sometimes including property division, without terminating marital status.
Caution: The commonly repeated six-state list (Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Texas) is not accurate as usually presented: Georgia and Mississippi both have a support-focused alternative (separate maintenance) even though neither has a proceeding called ‘legal separation.’ Whether that alternative should count as ‘having legal separation’ is partly a definitional choice the site should make explicitly rather than repeat the commonly cited list uncritically.
Residency requirements, waiting periods, and separation as a ground
Three different time-based rules get confused with each other. A residency requirement is how long you must have lived in the state before you can even file. A waiting period, or cooling-off period, is how long the court must wait after filing before it can enter a final decree. A separation requirement as a ground is a period spouses must have already lived apart before they are even eligible to file for divorce on that basis.
Where it bites. These three clocks run differently and some states have more than one running at once. Confusing ‘how long you must live apart before you can file’ with ‘how long after filing before the decree is final’ leads to badly wrong timeline expectations for someone planning a divorce.
Nevada has one of the shortest residency requirements in the country. California has one of the longest mandatory post-filing waiting periods. North Carolina requires a full year of separation before a spouse is even eligible to file, which functions as a ground-based prerequisite rather than a post-filing cooling-off period.
Everything we found for it traced back to marketing pages rather than to a statute we could read ourselves. The pattern above is right. The state-by-state detail is coming once we can read it at the source.
4 more we found but would not publish, because the only source was a law firm’s marketing page or an encyclopedia. Checked 31 August 2026.
Caution: This axis was researched primarily through a secondary aggregator (divorce.law) rather than confirmed against each cited statute’s primary text directly, because of the search budget for this job. The California and North Carolina statute cites in particular should be read against the actual code sections before being presented on the site as verified.
Caution: Many states layer more than one of these three requirements at once (a residency requirement to file, plus a separate waiting period before the decree), and a state with a short residency requirement is not necessarily fast overall if it also has a long post-filing waiting period, or vice versa; the site should present these as three independent clocks, not a single ‘how long does divorce take’ number.
Date of valuation
This is the date a court uses to price the house, the 401(k), the business, or the stock account before dividing it. Some states lock that date at separation, some at the filing of the divorce complaint, some at trial, and some leave it to the judge’s discretion, sometimes using a different date for different kinds of assets.
Where it bites. A stock portfolio, a business, or a house can be worth a very different amount six months or two years apart. If the rule is ‘date of separation’ and the house gains 200,000 dollars in value before trial, the spouse who moved out may never see a share of that gain. If the rule is ‘date of trial’ instead, a business that grew because one spouse worked eighty-hour weeks after separation can suddenly become half the other spouse’s asset too. Which date a state picks decides who gets the appreciation, and it is rarely explained to people going through a divorce.
No single rule dominates: a meaningful group of states value as of the date of trial or as close to it as practicable (California, Illinois, Colorado’s decree/hearing date, Virginia’s evidentiary hearing date), a meaningful group fix the marital estate or its value at separation or filing (North Carolina at separation, New Jersey at the complaint for what counts as marital, Minnesota near the start of the case), and several states give judges outright discretion to pick whatever date is fair given the facts (Florida, Pennsylvania for nonmarital growth, New York within a court-set range).
| State | What it says there | Where it is written |
|---|---|---|
| New York | The court sets a valuation date for each asset that can fall anywhere between the date the divorce action was commenced and the date of trial, so it is not a single fixed rule but a range the court chooses within. | N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law s. 236(B)(4)(b) |
| New Jersey | The marital estate is cut off as of the date the divorce complaint is filed; property acquired after that generally is not subject to equitable distribution, though the value assigned to what is already in the estate can still be assessed closer to trial. | Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196 (1974) |
| Pennsylvania | Courts have discretion to value marital property as of the date of trial or another date the parties agree to or the court orders; for the marital share of an asset’s growth in value, the statute picks whichever date, separation or the hearing date, produces the smaller increase. | 23 Pa. C.S. s. 3501, s. 3502 |
| Illinois | Courts have discretion to value marital and non-marital property as of the date of trial, or a different date agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court. | 750 ILCS 5/503(f), (k) |
| Virginia | Marital property is valued as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on valuation, though a party can ask the court to use a different date for good cause. | Va. Code s. 20-107.3(A) |
| North Carolina | Marital property is valued as of the date the spouses separated, not the date of trial or distribution. | N.C. Gen. Stat. s. 50-21(b) |
| California | The default rule is to value community assets and liabilities as close to the time of trial as practicable, but a court can value some or all of the estate at an earlier post-separation date if a party gives 30 days’ notice and shows good cause. | Cal. Fam. Code s. 2552 |
| Florida | The judge decides what date is just and equitable under the circumstances for valuing marital assets and liabilities, but the cutoff date for which assets even count as marital is generally the filing of the divorce petition. | Fla. Stat. s. 61.075(7) |
| Colorado | Property is valued as of the date of the divorce decree, or as of the date of the property hearing if that hearing happens before the decree. | C.R.S. s. 14-10-113(5) |
| Minnesota | Marital assets are valued as of the day of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement conference, unless the parties agree to a different date or the court finds another date is fair and equitable. | Minn. Stat. s. 518.58, subd. 1 |
| Wisconsin | The statute does not fix a valuation date, but courts have said the marital estate is usually valued as of the date of divorce, with deviation allowed for circumstances beyond a party’s control. | Wis. Stat. s. 767.61; Long v. Long, 196 Wis. 2d 691, 539 N.W.2d 462 |
| Connecticut | The statute does not name a valuation date, but the Supreme Court has held the date of dissolution is the appropriate date to value the parties’ assets, with the separation date sometimes relevant to how contributions to later appreciation are weighed. | Conn. Gen. Stat. s. 46b-81; Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508 (1998) |
12 read on a legislature’s or court’s own site. Checked 31 August 2026.
Caution: New Jersey’s Painter rule fixes the cutoff for what counts as marital property (the complaint date), which is a related but distinct question from the date used to price an already-included asset; the two get blurred in casual explanations.
Caution: Pennsylvania and several other states apply one valuation approach to ordinary marital assets and a different, narrower one to the marital share of an asset that was separate property before the marriage.
Caution: The active versus passive distinction (explained on this page) is decided case by case within many of these states and is not always spelled out in the statute itself, so the citations above give the state’s default date, not how every asset type is actually treated.
Fault grounds, and whether misconduct affects alimony or property
A no-fault divorce lets either spouse end the marriage without proving the other did anything wrong, typically by citing irreconcilable differences or a period of separation. A fault ground requires proving specific misconduct, like adultery or cruelty, to get the divorce itself. These are separate from the question of whether that same misconduct can affect how much alimony is awarded or how property is divided, which some no-fault states still allow.
Where it bites. A state can be no-fault for the divorce itself while still statutorily punishing (or statutorily ignoring) an affair when it comes to writing the alimony check, and the two rules do not always align the way people assume.
Most states have added a no-fault ground alongside older fault grounds rather than repealing the fault grounds outright, so a majority of states technically retain fault grounds even though most divorces there are filed no-fault. On alimony specifically, a smaller group of states expressly forbid a court from weighing marital misconduct at all, while several other states either expressly allow it or, in the case of adultery, statutorily bar the adulterous spouse from receiving alimony outright.
| State | What it says there | Where it is written |
|---|---|---|
| South Carolina | Adultery statutorily bars the adulterous spouse from receiving alimony, if the adultery occurred before a settlement agreement was signed or a permanent separate-maintenance order entered. | S.C. Code Ann. s. 20-3-130(A) |
| California | Purely no-fault for the divorce itself, and marital misconduct (specific acts) is generally excluded from alimony and property determinations, consistent with its no-fault framework, though this research did not directly confirm the exact bar-on-misconduct statute text. | Cal. Fam. Code s. 2335 (limits evidence of specific acts of misconduct) (bar or law-school source) |
| Texas | Retains fault grounds (including adultery and cruelty) alongside a no-fault insupportability ground, and fault can be considered by the court both in granting a disproportionate share of the community estate and in alimony decisions. | Tex. Fam. Code s. 6.001-6.007 (grounds); s. 7.001 (just and right division) (bar or law-school source) |
| New York | Retains fault grounds alongside its no-fault ground, but marital fault is generally excluded from equitable distribution and maintenance factors, except in rare ‘egregious’ misconduct cases recognized by courts, sometimes called the Blickstein exception in secondary sources. | N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law s. 236(B) (bar or law-school source) |
1 read on a legislature’s or court’s own site; 3 on a bar association or law school site. Checked 31 August 2026.
Caution: The American Bar Association’s 50-state family law chart, used as the main source for the broad fault-based versus no-fault state counts here, is a reasonable secondary source but was read through an automated summary rather than the full underlying table, and its classification of some individual states (for example listing California among states that ‘permit’ fault consideration) reads as inconsistent with California’s well-known no-fault framework; that specific row should be independently re-verified before publication rather than repeated as stated.
Caution: Because of the search budget, this axis names only four states in real depth (South Carolina, California, Texas, New York) rather than the full spread the brief envisioned; the site should treat the broader ‘which states bar or permit fault consideration’ lists as a starting point for further verification, not a finished, citable fact set.
Dissipation, or marital waste
Dissipation is spending, gambling away, gifting to someone outside the marriage, or destroying marital money or property, usually after the marriage has started to break down. When a court finds it happened, it can charge the value back against the spending spouse’s share instead of splitting the loss between both people.
Where it bites. If one spouse spends 40,000 dollars on an affair, a gambling habit, or gifts to a new partner while the marriage is falling apart, that money is gone from the pool the couple would otherwise split. Without a dissipation claim, both spouses effectively absorb half that loss. With one, the court can award the other spouse an offsetting amount from the dissipating spouse’s share, so the loss lands on the person who caused it instead of being split down the middle.
Most states that recognize dissipation do it through case law rather than a detailed statute, applying a version of the same core test: spending has to be for a purpose unrelated to the marriage and has to happen at a time the marriage was already breaking down or divorce was contemplated. Illinois, Florida, New York, and California are the clearest exceptions, since each has codified either the doctrine itself, a time window, or a notice requirement directly in statute.
| State | What it says there | Where it is written |
|---|---|---|
| Illinois | Dissipation is statutory, with a required written notice before trial, a defined outer time limit on how far back a claim can reach, and a burden that shifts to the accused spouse once a prima facie case is shown. | 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(2); In re Marriage of O’Neill, 138 Ill. 2d 487 (1990) (bar or law-school source) |
| Florida | Dissipation is statutory and requires intentional misconduct; the court can look at waste that happened after the divorce petition was filed or in the two years before it. | Fla. Stat. s. 61.075(1)(i) |
| New Jersey | Dissipation is a judicial doctrine; courts weigh how close the spending was to separation, whether it matched the couple’s normal spending pattern, whether it benefited the marriage or just one spouse, and how necessary and how large the expenditure was. | Kothari v. Kothari, 255 N.J. Super. 500 (App. Div. 1992) |
| California | Dissipation is statutory: if one spouse deliberately misappropriated community property, the court can award the other spouse an amount from that spouse’s share to make up for it. | Cal. Fam. Code s. 2602 |
| New York | New York expressly bars considering marital misconduct generally when dividing property, but still lists wasteful dissipation of assets as its own statutory factor a court can weigh. | N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law s. 236(B)(5)(d)(12) |
| Maryland | Dissipation is a judicial doctrine, not statutory. The party claiming it must make a prima facie showing the funds were spent without the other spouse’s agreement, the burden then shifts to the spending spouse to show the money went to a marital or family purpose, but the claimant keeps the ultimate burden of persuading the court dissipation occurred; there is no fixed time window. | Goicochea v. Goicochea, No. 0877, Sept. Term 2020 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), citing Omayaka v. Omayaka, Welsh v. Welsh, Sharp v. Sharp |
| Virginia | Waste and dissipation are recognized through case law applying a statutory factor; a court cannot weigh spending against a spouse as dissipation unless the money was spent in anticipation of divorce or separation and at a time the marriage was already in jeopardy. | Va. Code s. 20-107.3(E)(5) |
| North Carolina | Dissipation is a statutory factor: courts can weigh either party’s acts to waste, neglect, devalue, or convert marital or divisible property when dividing it. | N.C. Gen. Stat. s. 50-20(c)(11a) |
| Connecticut | Connecticut does not name dissipation in its statute, but courts treat intentional waste or a selfish financial transaction as a factor, and require it to have occurred in contemplation of divorce or while the marriage was undergoing an irretrievable breakdown. | Conn. Gen. Stat. s. 46b-81; Gershman v. Gershman, 286 Conn. 341 (2008); Finan v. Finan, 287 Conn. 491 (2008) |
| Colorado | Colorado’s statute does not use the word dissipation, but courts apply a judge-made ‘economic fault’ doctrine that treats depletion of the marital estate as a relevant factor in dividing property, distinct from marital misconduct generally. | C.R.S. s. 14-10-113 |
| Missouri | Missouri’s statute does not name dissipation directly; it lists the general conduct of the parties during the marriage as one factor in dividing marital property, and Missouri courts have applied that factor to spending that depletes the marital estate. | Mo. Rev. Stat. s. 452.330.1(4) |
10 read on a legislature’s or court’s own site; 1 on a bar association or law school site. Checked 31 August 2026.
Caution: New York and North Carolina both bar considering marital misconduct generally when dividing property, but each still allows a dissipation or waste claim as its own separate, narrower factor; readers often assume a no-fault state cannot touch this kind of spending, and that is wrong.
Caution: Missouri and Colorado do not use the word ‘dissipation’ in their statutes at all; what functions as a dissipation claim there is really a judge applying a broader ‘conduct’ or ‘economic fault’ factor, so the strength of a claim depends much more on the specific case law than on statutory text.
Caution: Where a case citation above lacks a page-pinned quote, the citation itself is still to a source we verified directly (a state court, state legislature, or bar-association document), not to a law firm’s summary of it.
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