A prenup rarely fails because of what it says.
It fails because of how it was signed. Here is the whole picture, in plain English, with every rule traced back to the statute it comes from.
A prenuptial agreement is a contract about money, signed before a wedding, that tells a future court how to divide things if the marriage ends. It is not romantic and it is not an insult. It is the same decision as writing a will — choosing the terms yourself rather than letting a default rule choose them for you.
The thing almost nobody is told: prenups very rarely fail because of what they say. They fail because of how they were signed. Bad disclosure, no separate lawyer, and a signature three days before the wedding kill far more agreements than any clause ever has. That is why this section spends more space on procedure than on wording, and why the clause examples are annotated rather than fill-in-the-blank.
This page is the law: what an agreement can say, what quietly voids it, and every state side by side. These ten pages are the rest of it — start with whichever question is actually yours.
The short version5 points · tap one to jump to it
- The four ways a prenup dies — Read them in order — they compound.
- What cannot go in one, in any state — Some terms are void no matter how carefully they are drafted, how well the parties understood them, or how much both people wanted them.
- Spousal support is the clause that changes most by state — “Can I waive alimony?” has four different answers depending on where you live, and the difference is not cosmetic.
- Every state, side by side — Where we could not read a state's code from an official source, the row says so.
- Where to go next — This is an explanation of how these agreements work and where they fall apart, written so you can have a better conversation with a lawyer — not so you can skip having one.
In this subject 5
The four ways a prenup dies
The short version5 points · tap one to jump to it
- The four ways a prenup dies — Read them in order — they compound.
- What cannot go in one, in any state — Some terms are void no matter how carefully they are drafted, how well the parties understood them, or how much both people wanted them.
- Spousal support is the clause that changes most by state — “Can I waive alimony?” has four different answers depending on where you live, and the difference is not cosmetic.
- Every state, side by side — Where we could not read a state's code from an official source, the row says so.
- Where to go next — This is an explanation of how these agreements work and where they fall apart, written so you can have a better conversation with a lawyer — not so you can skip having one.
In this subject 5
Every reported challenge we could trace comes back to one of these. Read them in order — they compound.
1Inadequate financial disclosure
One party signs away rights without a real picture of what they are giving up. The classic version is not an outright lie — it is a vague, stale or partial schedule: ‘various brokerage accounts’, a business listed at book value, an unvested equity package or a pending inheritance omitted entirely.
It depends heavily on which model the state uses, and the difference is the single most important thing a consumer can understand. UNDER UPAA, a disclosure failure alone is NOT enough. The challenger must prove the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed AND all three of: no fair and reasonable disclosure, no written waiver of further disclosure, and no adequate independent knowledge. UNDER UPMAA, inadequate disclosure is a standalone ground to void: a party has adequate disclosure only if they received ‘a reasonably accurate description and good-faith estimate of value of the property, liabilities, and income of the other party’ (or knowingly waived it in a separate signed record, or already had adequate knowledge). Two states go further in opposite directions: Iowa makes the grounds disjunctive, so a disclosure failure by itself can defeat the agreement; Pennsylvania drops unconscionability entirely and makes disclosure the substantive test, but requires clear and convincing evidence. Minnesota codifies ‘full and fair disclosure’ as a defined term and — unusually — forbids waiving it.
What it looks like. He owns 40% of a private company. The schedule attached to the prenup says ‘Interest in ABC Holdings LLC — value uncertain.’ Nine years later the company sells and his stake is worth $18m; she asks the court to set the agreement aside. In a UPAA state like Texas she has a hard road: she must also show the whole deal was unconscionable back when she signed it. In North Dakota (UPMAA) she has a much better argument on its own — ‘value uncertain’ is not ‘a reasonably accurate description and good-faith estimate of value.’ In Iowa, the disclosure failure alone can carry it. In Pennsylvania it is the whole ballgame, but she must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
2No independent counsel / one lawyer for both
One party’s lawyer drafts the agreement; the other party either has no lawyer, or is told ‘you don’t need one, this is standard,’ or meets a lawyer for twenty minutes on the day of signing. Where a single lawyer purports to act for both, there is no one whose job it is to argue for the weaker side.
There is no national rule, and the range is genuinely wide. (1) CLOSEST TO A REQUIREMENT — California: an agreement is DEEMED not executed voluntarily unless the court finds the challenging party either was represented by independent counsel at signing or, after being advised to seek it, expressly waived counsel IN A SEPARATE WRITING; and that advisement must be given at least seven calendar days before the final agreement is signed. California separately makes independent counsel a precondition for any spousal-support provision. Minnesota flatly requires that each spouse be represented by SEPARATE legal counsel for a POSTNUPTIAL agreement to be valid. (2) STRUCTURAL GROUND TO VOID — the UPMAA states: no ‘access to independent legal representation’ is itself a ground to void, and access is defined to include a reasonable time to find and consult a lawyer plus a financial-ability/fee-shifting condition; if the party was in fact unrepresented, the agreement must also carry the conspicuous statutory notice-of-waiver-of-rights. (3) EXPRESS STATUTORY FACTOR — New Jersey, since P.L. 2013, c. 72, lists failure to consult independent counsel (absent a written waiver of the opportunity) among the circumstances that make an agreement unconscionable. (4) A PRESUMPTION, NOT A RULE — South Carolina makes an antenuptial agreement ‘presumptively fair and equitable’ when both parties were separately represented and fully disclosed. (5) TOTALITY FACTOR — Nebraska. (6) EXPRESSLY NOT FATAL — Wisconsin says in terms that one lawyer for both, or one represented and one not, ‘does not by itself make a marital property agreement unconscionable or otherwise affect its enforceability.’
What it looks like. His attorney sends her a draft and a cover note: ‘You’re welcome to have this reviewed, but it’s a standard agreement.’ She signs without a lawyer. In Wisconsin that fact, standing alone, does not touch enforceability. In California the agreement is presumed involuntary unless the court can find in writing that she was advised to get her own lawyer at least seven days before signing and then waived counsel in a separate signed document — and any spousal-support waiver in it is dead on arrival regardless. In Colorado or North Dakota her lack of access to counsel is a freestanding ground to void, and because she was unrepresented the agreement also had to contain the conspicuous statutory warning list.
3Timing and duress — signed too close to the wedding
The agreement appears days or hours before the ceremony, when the venue is paid for, the relatives have flown in, and refusing means calling off a wedding in public. Courts treat that not as its own doctrine but as evidence going to voluntariness/duress — with two states that have converted it into a number.
HARD STATUTORY WAITING PERIODS — only two were found, and only one is a true bar. (1) CALIFORNIA: Cal. Fam. Code § 1615(c)(2) — an agreement is deemed NOT executed voluntarily unless the party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days between first being presented with the final agreement and signing it. Two important details that are usually reported wrong: for agreements executed between 1 Jan 2002 and 1 Jan 2020 the clock ran from being presented with the final agreement AND advised to seek independent counsel, whereas for agreements executed ON OR AFTER 1 JANUARY 2020 the seven days run from presentation of the final agreement ‘regardless of whether the party is represented by legal counsel’ — so the 2020 amendment made the waiting period apply even to a fully lawyered-up party. In both versions the period does not restart for ‘nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms.’ Section 1615(c)(1) adds a separate seven-day rule: the advisement to seek independent counsel must be given at least seven calendar days before the final agreement is signed. (2) MINNESOTA: Minn. Stat. § 519.11, subd. 1b(b)(5) makes it an element of ‘procedural fairness’ that the agreement be ‘entered into and executed no less than seven days before the marriage’ — but subd. 1b(c) softens this into a burden-allocation rule rather than an automatic bar: at least seven days out, the agreement is PRESUMED enforceable and the challenger bears the burden; inside seven days, there is no presumption and the PROPONENT bears the burden. Minnesota’s seven days run to the WEDDING; California’s run from presentation of the final draft to SIGNING. That is a meaningful difference. Minnesota’s rule applies only to agreements executed on or after 1 Aug 2024, and expressly does not apply to postnuptial agreements. TOTALITY STATES — everywhere else that was verified, timing is one factor among several. The clearest articulation found on an official site is Nebraska’s: proximity of execution to the wedding, and surprise in the presentation of the agreement, are the first of five listed voluntariness factors. The UPMAA states express the same idea qualitatively rather than numerically, requiring ‘a reasonable time’ to decide whether to retain a lawyer, locate one, obtain advice and consider it.
What it looks like. The agreement is handed over on the Thursday; the wedding is Saturday. In California that agreement fails the voluntariness test outright — and since 1 Jan 2020 it fails even if she had her own excellent lawyer read it Thursday night. In Minnesota it is not automatically void, but the presumption of enforceability is gone and HE has to prove it was fair. In Nebraska, Texas or Virginia the two-day gap is merely evidence; she still has to win on the statutory grounds, and in Virginia she additionally has to overcome the statutory presumption that the agreement’s own recitals are factually correct.
4Unconscionability at enforcement vs at signing
An agreement that looked survivable on the wedding day looks brutal twenty-five years later — she left the workforce, he compounded, and the deal caps her at a number that was reasonable in 1999. Whether a court can even look at that depends entirely on whether the state measures fairness at SIGNING or at ENFORCEMENT, and this is the sharpest doctrinal split in the whole area.
FOUR DISTINCT POSITIONS were verified. (1) SIGNING ONLY — the UPAA default. Unconscionability is tested ‘when it was executed’; later hardship is irrelevant to validity. Texas, Montana, Maine, Idaho, Nebraska, Arizona, Illinois, Rhode Island, Virginia and others use this wording verbatim. In every one of these states the statute also makes unconscionability a question of law for the court, not a jury question. (2) SIGNING ONLY, AND DELIBERATELY SO — New Jersey. Before 2013 N.J.S.A. 37:2-38(b) allowed a challenge on the ground the agreement was unconscionable at the time enforcement was sought. P.L. 2013, c. 72 DELETED that subsection outright, added the independent-counsel factor, and added the closing sentence ‘An agreement shall not be deemed unconscionable unless the circumstances set out in subsection c. of this section are applicable.’ New Jersey therefore moved decisively from a second-look state to a signing-only state, effective for agreements entered into on or after 27 June 2013. (3) LIMITED SECOND LOOK, CONFINED TO SUPPORT — California and Colorado. California will not enforce a spousal-support provision that is ‘unconscionable at the time of enforcement,’ but property terms are not subject to that test. Colorado, having reserved the general UPMAA hardship provision, applies unconscionability at the time of enforcement ONLY to terms determining, modifying, limiting or eliminating spousal maintenance or waiving/allocating attorney fees. (4) FULL SECOND LOOK — North Dakota, which enacted the uniform UPMAA text: a court may refuse to enforce a TERM if, in the context of the agreement taken as a whole, the term was unconscionable at signing OR enforcement ‘would result in substantial hardship for a party because of a material change in circumstances arising after the agreement was signed.’ Minnesota reaches a comparable place by different words: substantive fairness asks whether the agreement is unconscionable ‘either by the agreement’s terms or as the result of drastically changed circumstances originally not foreseen,’ while expressly providing that merely deviating from the statutory property-division or maintenance standards does not by itself make an agreement unconscionable. Illinois occupies a middle position, allowing relief from a support waiver causing ‘undue hardship in light of circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the execution.’ And Pennsylvania sits outside the framework altogether — § 3106 contains no unconscionability test at either moment.
What it looks like. Same facts, four outcomes. Married 1999, prenup waives all spousal support and all appreciation of his separate business; she stops working in 2004 to raise their children; they divorce in 2026 and his separate estate is worth $30m while she has almost nothing. In NORTH DAKOTA she can ask the court to refuse to enforce the support waiver as causing substantial hardship from a material change in circumstances. In CALIFORNIA she can attack the support waiver as unconscionable at the time of enforcement — but not the property terms. In COLORADO the same limited attack is available on maintenance and attorney fees only. In NEW JERSEY, for an agreement signed after 27 June 2013, that argument no longer exists: the court looks only at what she knew and how she signed back in 1999.
What cannot go in one, in any state
Some terms are void no matter how carefully they are drafted, how well the parties understood them, or how much both people wanted them.
- Child support. The right belongs to the child, not the parents, so parents cannot bargain it away before the child exists. California puts it plainly: “The right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement.” Cal. Fam. Code § 1612(b) · 750 ILCS 10/4(b) · Iowa Code § 596.5(2) · Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-310(2)(a)
- Custody and parenting time. Custody is decided on the child’s best interests as they exist at the time of the decision — something a court cannot delegate to a contract signed years earlier. The newer uniform act handles this with a distinctive phrase: the term is not void, it is simply “not binding on the court.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-310(1), (3) · N.D.C.C. § 14-03.2-09(1), (3)
- Anything that rewards or penalises divorce. You cannot build a contract where one spouse profits from ending the marriage. Ohio codified this in 2023 in as many words: the terms must “not promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3103.061(D) · Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-310(2)(c), (d)
- Lifestyle clauses — and here we are going to be careful with you. Weight requirements, frequency-of-sex clauses, in-law visit limits, chore schedules, infidelity penalties. Every premarital statute defines what you may contract about, and the list is financial: property, its management, what happens on separation or death, wills and trusts, life insurance, choice of law — plus a catch-all for “any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy.” That public-policy limit is where lifestyle clauses live or die, and it is decided case by case. We are not going to tell you “courts have struck these down,” because we could not confirm a single appellate holding on a specific lifestyle clause from an official court source. What we can tell you is the statutory framework, and that most drafters treat these clauses as unenforceable decoration that risks tainting the parts you actually need. Cal. Fam. Code § 1612(a)(7) · Tex. Fam. Code § 4.003(a)(8) · Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-310(2)(e)
Spousal support is the clause that changes most by state
“Can I waive alimony?” has four different answers depending on where you live, and the difference is not cosmetic.
Flatly void
Iowa. § 596.5(2) says “The right of a spouse or child to support shall not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement” — the word spouse is Iowa’s own addition to the uniform text — and Iowa’s list of permitted subjects omits spousal support entirely. An Iowa prenup cannot waive alimony, full stop.
Permitted, with a public-assistance floor
The uniform-act majority. You may waive support, but if the waiver would put your former spouse on public benefits, the court may order support anyway “to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.” The taxpayer, in effect, is not a party to your contract and does not consent to your terms.
Permitted only with your own lawyer
California. Cal. Fam. Code § 1612(c): a spousal support provision is unenforceable if the party against whom it is sought was not represented by independent counsel when they signed. And independent counsel alone does not save it — the provision still cannot be unconscionable at the time enforcement is sought.
Permitted with no floor at all
South Dakota. When South Dakota enacted the uniform act it dropped spousal support from the list of permitted subjects and dropped the public-assistance safety valve. Its § 25-2-18(a) has seven items where the uniform text has eight. There is no statutory floor under a South Dakota alimony waiver.
Every state, side by side
45 of 51 jurisdictions confirmed from the state’s own statutory text. Where we could not read a state’s code from an official source, the row says so.
| State | Governed by | Waiting period | Independent counsel | Worth knowing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama No premarital agreement act. Related: Ala. Code § 30-4-9 (spousal contracts); Ala. Code § 43-8-72 (premarital waiver of elective share) |
common law | — | not addressed by statute | Alabama has NOT adopted the UPAA. A full-code search of the Code of Alabama for ‘premarital’ returned only three unrelated sections (6-6-26.01, 16-40A-1, 35-4A-5), and Title 30 Chapter 4 contains no premarital-agreement provision. The operative enforceability test therefore comes from Alabama appellate case law, which we could not read from an official court host, so no case is cited here. Consumers should note § 30-4-9’s ‘confidential relations’ rule: Alabama treats spouse-to-spouse contracts as fiduciary in character. |
| Alaska Alaska Stat. § 34.77.090 (Alaska Community Property Act); see also Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160 |
own statute | — | not required | Alaska has not enacted the UPAA. Its opt-in community-property statute is the only Alaska statute that sets an enforceability test for a premarital agreement, and it imposes a formality no other state has: § 34.77.090(b) requires the agreement to open with a specific ALL-CAPS warning (‘THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE VERY EXTENSIVE … IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS AGREEMENT, YOU SHOULD SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE’). § 34.77.090(f): people intending to marry may sign as if married, but it takes effect only on marriage. § 34.77.090(c): cannot adversely affect a child’s right to support. Ordinary (non-community-property) Alaska prenups are governed by case law that we could not read from an official court host here. |
| Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-201 to 25-205 (Uniform Premarital Agreement Act); enforcement at § 25-202 |
UPAA | — | not required | Standard UPAA text. Unconscionability measured at execution and decided by the court as a matter of law (§ 25-202(C)(2), (E)). Short title ‘Uniform Premarital Agreement Act’ confirmed in the Title 25 index at azleg.gov. |
| Arkansas | Not confirmed. Arkansas remains unconfirmed. Everything reachable about Arkansas premarital-agreement law came from non-authoritative sources, so nothing is reported. Treat Arkansas as an open item. | |||
| California Cal. Fam. Code §§ 1600-1617 (Premarital Agreements); esp. §§ 1611, 1612, 1615 |
UPAA, heavily amended | 7 days | effectively required | Also requires, for an unrepresented party, a written explanation of the terms, basic effect and rights being given up, delivered before signing, plus a signed acknowledgment identifying who gave it, and language proficiency in the language used (§ 1615(c)(3)). Child support cannot be adversely affected (§ 1612(b)). |
| Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 14-2-301 to 14-2-313 (Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act), HB 13-1204, eff. 1 July 2014 |
UPMAA | — | required in substance — access to counsel | Covers premarital AND marital (post-nuptial) agreements under one standard. Colorado did NOT enact the uniform general hardship provision — § 14-2-309(6) and (7) are ‘[Reserved]’, and § 14-2-309(4)(b) (the separate-record disclosure waiver) is also ‘[Reserved]’, so unlike North Dakota a Colorado party apparently cannot simply waive disclosure in a separate signed record. Express unenforceable-terms list at § 14-2-310 (child support, domestic-violence remedies, modifying divorce grounds, penalizing divorce, public policy); custody terms ‘not binding on the court’. § 14-2-303.5 extends the part to civil unions. |
| Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-36a to 46b-36j (Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act) |
own statute | — | required in substance — a reasonable opportunity to consult | Second look at enforcement. Connecticut is one of the most consumer-protective states in the country on prenups. Its four grounds are DISJUNCTIVE — proving any one defeats the agreement — where the UPAA requires unconscionability AND failed disclosure together. It is also one of the very few states to write a ‘second look’ at enforcement into the statute, and one of the few to make denial of a reasonable opportunity to consult your own lawyer a freestanding ground. § 46b-36j: agreements signed before October 1, 1995 are unaffected by the Act. |
| Delaware 13 Del. C. §§ 321-328 (Premarital Agreements); enforcement at § 326 |
UPAA | — | not required | Standard UPAA text: unenforceable if not executed voluntarily, or unconscionable when executed plus the three conjunctive disclosure failures. Child-support carve-out confirmed. |
| District of Columbia D.C. Code §§ 46-501 to 46-510 (Premarital Agreements); content at § 46-503, enforcement at § 46-506 |
UPAA | — | not required | Not a state, included for completeness. D.C. Law 16-79 extended the act to domestic partnerships, substituting ‘spousal or domestic partner support’ for ‘spousal support’ and adding termination of a domestic partnership under § 32-702. |
| Florida Fla. Stat. § 61.079 (Premarital agreements — Uniform Premarital Agreement Act) |
UPAA | — | not required | Short title ‘Uniform Premarital Agreement Act’ confirmed in the text of § 61.079. Child-support carve-out confirmed. |
| Georgia | Not confirmed. Georgia remains unconfirmed. The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is published under contract by LexisNexis and is not mirrored on any Georgia .gov host; the Supreme Court of Georgia posts only current-year opinions. Treat Georgia as unconfirmed. | |||
| Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 572D (§§ 572D-1 to 572D-11), Uniform Premarital Agreement Act |
UPAA | — | not required | Hawaii’s version is unusually broad in what you may contract about: § 572D-3(a)(8) allows ‘any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations,’ and § 572D-3(a)(6) expressly reaches life-insurance death benefits. The safety valve in § 572D-6(b) means a spousal-support waiver can be overridden to the extent needed to keep one spouse off public assistance. Child support can never be adversely affected (§ 572D-3(b)). |
| Idaho Idaho Code §§ 32-921 to 32-929 (Title 32, ch. 9); enforcement at § 32-925; short title at § 32-929 |
UPAA | — | not required | Verbatim UPAA enforcement text confirmed at § 32-925(1). Sits inside the community-property chapter (‘Husband and Wife — Separate and Community Property’). |
| Illinois 750 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (Illinois Uniform Premarital Agreement Act); content at 10/4, enforcement at 10/7 |
UPAA | — | not required | Child-support carve-out at 10/4(b). Unconscionability measured at execution and decided by the court as a matter of law (10/7(c)). |
| Indiana | Not confirmed. Indiana remains unconfirmed. Treat as an open item; the site may work from a different network region. | |||
| Iowa Iowa Code ch. 596 (Premarital Agreements); content at § 596.5, enforcement at § 596.8, unconscionability at § 596.9 |
UPAA, adopted with major deviations | — | not required | Two significant deviations from UPAA. First, § 596.8(1) makes the grounds DISJUNCTIVE — the challenger need prove ‘any of the following’: involuntary execution, OR unconscionability when executed, OR a disclosure failure combined with lack of adequate knowledge. Under standard UPAA these are conjunctive. Second, the spousal-support waiver ban above. § 596.8(2) requires severance of an unenforceable provision rather than voiding the whole agreement. |
| Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-2401 to 23-2408 (Uniform Premarital Agreement Act) |
UPAA | — | not addressed by statute | Standard UPAA. § 23-2403: writing signed by both, enforceable without consideration. § 23-2405: effective on marriage. § 23-2406: amend or revoke only by signed writing. § 23-2408: if the marriage is void the agreement is enforceable ‘only to the extent necessary to avoid an inequitable result.’ Child support cannot be adversely affected (§ 23-2404(b)). |
| Kentucky No premarital agreement act. Related: KRS 403.180 (separation agreements); KRS 392.120 (jointure as a bar to dower/curtesy); KRS 404.020 (spousal property and contract rights) |
common law | — | not addressed by statute | Kentucky has NOT adopted the UPAA. The full section lists of KRS chapters 402 (Marriage), 403 (Dissolution), 404 (Contracts and separate estate) and 392 (Dower and curtesy) were read on the official Legislative Research Commission site and contain no premarital-agreement provision. Kentucky’s enforceability test is therefore judge-made; the controlling Kentucky Supreme Court opinion we could not read from an official court host, so no case is cited. Practical consequence for consumers: with no statute, Kentucky courts are freer to weigh changed circumstances at divorce than in a strict UPAA state. |
| Louisiana La. Civ. Code arts. 2325-2331; esp. art. 2328 (matrimonial agreement defined), art. 2329 (exclusion or modification of regime), art. 2330 (limits of contractual freedom), art. 2331 (form) |
own statute — civil-law matrimonial regime, not UPAA | — | not required by the Code text | Most distinctive rule found in this research: a matrimonial agreement made BEFORE marriage is freely permitted, but one that modifies or terminates the regime DURING marriage is allowed ‘only upon joint petition and a finding by the court that this serves their best interests and that they understand the governing principles and rules’ (art. 2329). Spouses moving into Louisiana get a one-year window to contract without court approval, and may subject themselves to the legal regime at any time without approval. Form: authentic act, or act under private signature duly acknowledged (art. 2331). Art. 2330 bars renouncing or altering the marital portion or the established order of succession. |
| Maine 19-A M.R.S. §§ 601-611 (ch. 21, ‘Uniform Premarital Agreement Act’); enforcement at § 608 |
UPAA | — | not required | Chapter heading ‘UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT’ confirmed. Verbatim UPAA enforcement text; § 608(3) is the unconscionability-as-a-question-of-law provision. |
| Maryland Md. Code, Fam. Law § 8-101 |
common law, with a general enabling statute | — | not required by statute | § 8-101 does no more than authorize spouses to make a valid and enforceable deed or agreement relating to alimony, support, property rights or personal rights, and to settle those matters. The validity standards (disclosure, voluntariness, confidential relationship) are judge-made and were NOT verified here from an official court source. |
| Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, § 25 (Antenuptial settlements; force and effect) |
common law, with a narrow enabling statute | — | not required by statute | § 25 is a property statute: before marriage the parties may contract in writing that specified real or personal property or rights of action shall remain or become the property of one spouse, and may create fee or life estates and other lawful limitations, all taking effect at marriage as if by deed. It says nothing about disclosure, counsel or fairness. Massachusetts is the jurisdiction usually cited for both the prenup ‘second look’ and the heightened, fiduciary-flavoured scrutiny of postnuptial agreements, but NO Massachusetts appellate opinion could be retrieved from an official court source, so no holding is asserted here. |
| Michigan No premarital agreement act. Related: Mich. Comp. Laws § 557.28 (contract in contemplation of marriage survives the marriage); Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.2205 (waiver of surviving-spouse rights) |
common law | — | not addressed by statute | Michigan has NOT adopted the UPAA. The full section index of Act 216 of 1981 (MCL 557.21-557.29) was read and contains no enforceability standard beyond § 557.28’s one sentence. Michigan’s actual test for setting aside a prenup is judge-made; the controlling Michigan appellate opinion we could not read from an official court host here, so no case is cited. Two practical points that ARE statutory: (1) a prenup survives the wedding automatically (§ 557.28), and (2) giving up inheritance rights requires ‘fair disclosure’ (§ 700.2205). |
| Minnesota Minn. Stat. § 519.11 (Antenuptial and Postnuptial Agreements), as amended by 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 101, art. 3, § 1, applicable to agreements executed on or after 1 Aug 2024 |
own statute — rewritten 2024 | 7 days | a meaningful opportunity to consult counsel is required | Unusually prescriptive. Procedural fairness (subd. 1b) requires full and fair disclosure — a defined term meaning a reasonably accurate description of all material facts of income plus good-faith property valuations and the basis for them — and that requirement CANNOT BE WAIVED. Also requires writing, execution before TWO WITNESSES, and acknowledgment before a person authorized to administer an oath; a power of attorney will not do. Postnups carry a two-year presumption of unenforceability if either party files for separation or dissolution within two years of execution (subd. 1d(d)). Marriage itself is adequate consideration (subd. 1(c)). Severability where the agreement unambiguously permits it (subd. 1(e)). |
| Mississippi | Not confirmed. Mississippi remains unconfirmed. Treat as an open item. | |||
| Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.220 (Marriage contracts to be in writing, acknowledged or proved) |
common law, with a form statute | — | not required by statute | § 451.220 requires all marriage contracts intended to secure or convey any Missouri real or personal estate, or to affect such estate in law or equity, to be in writing and acknowledged by each contracting party or proved by one or more subscribing witnesses. Validity standards beyond form are judge-made and were NOT verified here. Cross-reference at RSMo § 474.130 (conveyance avoided if bar of inheritance rights fails). |
| Montana Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-2-601 to 40-2-610 (Title 40, ch. 2, pt. 6, ‘Uniform Premarital Agreement Act’); enforcement at § 40-2-608 |
UPAA | — | not required | Verbatim UPAA. Enacted Sec. 8, Ch. 189, Laws 1987. Unconscionability decided by the court as a matter of law (§ 40-2-608(3)). |
| Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-1001 to 42-1011 (Premarital Agreement Act); enforcement at § 42-1006 |
UPAA | — | not required, but weighed | The clearest statement of the totality-of-circumstances approach found on an official legislature site, because Nebraska publishes case annotations alongside the statute. Other annotations confirm that the challenger bears the burden (Mamot), that a disclosure failure alone is not sufficient (Edwards v. Edwards, 16 Neb. App. 297, 744 N.W.2d 243 (2008)), and that partial unconscionability does not void the whole agreement (Edwards). |
| Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 123A (Premarital Agreements); short title at NRS 123A.010 |
UPAA | — | not required | Standard UPAA structure confirmed from the chapter (NRS 123A.010 short title through the enforcement section). |
| New Hampshire N.H. RSA 460:2-a (Antenuptial Agreements) |
common law, with a short enabling statute | — | not required by statute | One sentence of substance: two people in contemplation of marriage may enter a written interspousal contract, and New Hampshire courts will give contracts made elsewhere the same effect the other jurisdiction’s courts would — an express choice-of-law deference rule that is unusual. The one hard limit: no term ‘which attempts to abrogate the statutory or common law rights of minor children of the contemplated marriage.’ Source: 1981, 369:1; amended 2023, 4:1, eff. 25 June 2023. |
| New Jersey N.J.S.A. 37:2-31 to 37:2-41 (Uniform Premarital and Pre-Civil Union Agreement Act); enforcement at § 37:2-38, as amended by P.L. 2013, c. 72 (approved 27 June 2013) |
UPAA, amended 2013 to remove the second look | — | an express statutory factor | The most consequential single amendment found in this research. P.L. 2013, c. 72 DELETED former § 37:2-38(b), which had allowed a challenge on the ground the agreement was unconscionable at the time enforcement was sought, added the independent-counsel factor, and added a closing sentence that an agreement ‘shall not be deemed unconscionable unless the circumstances set out in subsection c. of this section are applicable.’ The challenger’s burden is CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. Applies to agreements entered into on or after 27 June 2013, or entered into before but voluntarily revised on or after that date per § 37:2-37. Also covers pre-civil union agreements. |
| New Mexico | Not confirmed. Partial only: the article heading ‘Uniform Premarital Agreement’ inside NMSA 1978 Chapter 40 was seen on the official Compilation Commission host, which establishes that New Mexico has a UPAA-style article, but nothing about its o | |||
| New York N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(3); see also N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-311 |
own statute | — | not required by statute | Second look at enforcement. Two things trip New Yorkers up. First, notarization is not optional: the signatures must be ACKNOWLEDGED to deed-recording standard, and New York courts have voided otherwise fine agreements for a defective acknowledgment. (A convenience: for a pre-marriage agreement the acknowledgment may be taken by anyone authorized to solemnize a marriage under DRL § 11(1)-(3).) Second, GOL § 5-311 caps what you can waive: spouses ‘cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve either of his or her liability to support the other in such a manner that he or she will become incapable of self-support and therefore is likely to become a public charge.’ The agreement may cover testamentary provisions, waiver of the right of election, property division, maintenance, and child custody/support (the last always subject to DRL § 240). |
| North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 52B (Uniform Premarital Agreement Act), §§ 52B-1 to 52B-11; short title at § 52B-1, enforcement at § 52B-7 |
UPAA | — | not required | Short title ‘Uniform Premarital Agreement Act’ confirmed at § 52B-1. Child-support carve-out confirmed. |
| North Dakota N.D.C.C. ch. 14-03.2 (Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act); enforcement at § 14-03.2-08, unenforceable terms at § 14-03.2-09 |
UPMAA (the 2012 uniform act) | — | required in substance — access to counsel | Enacted the full uniform text including § 14-03.2-08(6): a court may refuse to enforce a TERM if, in the context of the agreement as a whole, it was unconscionable at signing OR its enforcement ‘would result in substantial hardship for a party because of a material change in circumstances arising after the agreement was signed’ — decided as a matter of law (§ 14-03.2-08(7)). Colorado, the other UPMAA state, reserved this. North Dakota also kept the uniform disclosure-waiver route: a party may expressly waive further financial disclosure ‘in a separate signed record’ (§ 14-03.2-08(4)(b)). Unenforceable terms at § 14-03.2-09 include child support, domestic-violence remedies, modifying divorce grounds and penalizing a party for filing; parental-rights terms are ‘not binding on the court’. |
| Ohio Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3103.05, 3103.06, 3103.061 (S.B. 210, 134th General Assembly, eff. 23 March 2023) |
own statute | — | not required by statute | Ohio permitted postnuptial agreements for the first time in 2023. § 3103.06 now lets spouses enter a postnuptial agreement altering their legal relations, modify or terminate an antenuptial or postnuptial agreement, and agree to an immediate separation with provision for property and support. § 3103.061 supplies the validity test, and it is the cleanest codification of the anti-divorce-incentive rule found anywhere: the agreement is valid, with or without consideration, only if (A) it is in writing and signed by both spouses, (B) it is entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching, (C) there was full disclosure, or full knowledge, and understanding of the nature, value and extent of both spouses’ property, and (D) ‘The terms do not promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.’ The official code page records the previous version of § 3103.06 as dating from 1 October 1953. |
| Oklahoma No premarital agreement act. Related: Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 121(B) (division ‘subject to a valid antenuptial contract in writing’); tit. 84, § 44(B)(1); tit. 43, §§ 204, 205 |
common law | — | not addressed by statute | Oklahoma has NOT adopted the UPAA and has no statutory enforceability test. What the statutes DO give a consumer is narrow but concrete: (1) a written antenuptial contract overrides the court’s otherwise-equitable division of property the couple acquired jointly during the marriage (tit. 43, § 121(B)); (2) it also overrides a will and the surviving spouse’s forced share (tit. 84, § 44); but (3) tit. 43, § 205 says spouses cannot contract to alter their legal relations ‘except as to property’ — so an Oklahoma agreement’s reach beyond property is doubtful. The rest of the enforceability standard is judge-made and we could not read from an official court host here. |
| Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 108.700 to 108.740 (Premarital Agreements) |
UPAA | — | not required | Section run confirmed: 108.700 definitions, 108.705 writing requirement, 108.710 subjects of agreement, 108.715 effective on marriage, 108.720 modification/revocation, 108.725 enforcement defenses, 108.730 void marriage, through 108.740. |
| Pennsylvania 23 Pa.C.S. § 3106 (Premarital agreements), added by Act 175 of 29 Nov. 2004, effective 60 days later, applicable to agreements executed on or after that date |
own statute — no unconscionability test at all | — | not required | The most pro-enforcement premarital statute confirmed in this research. The burden of proof to set an agreement aside is on the challenger, and the standard is CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. There are only two grounds: (1) the party did not execute the agreement voluntarily, or (2) before execution the party was not provided fair and reasonable disclosure, did not voluntarily and expressly waive further disclosure in writing, AND did not have adequate knowledge of the other party’s property or obligations. The word ‘unconscionable’ does not appear in § 3106 — Pennsylvania deliberately omitted the UPAA’s unconscionability element, so a substantively lopsided but properly disclosed and voluntarily signed agreement is not vulnerable on fairness grounds. |
| Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 15-17 (Uniform Premarital Agreement Act); enforcement at § 15-17-6 |
UPAA, adopted with a significant drafting deviation | — | not required | Read the conjunction carefully. Standard UPAA says an agreement is unenforceable if the challenger proves involuntary execution OR unconscionability-plus-non-disclosure. Rhode Island’s § 15-17-6(a) joins the two grounds with ‘AND’ — ‘(1) That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; AND (2) The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution…’. On its face that requires the challenger to prove BOTH involuntariness and unconscionability-plus-non-disclosure, which is a materially higher bar than the uniform act. Rhode Island also adds an express clear-and-convincing burden on the challenger as to each element (§ 15-17-6(b)). Flagged because the practical effect of the ‘and’ is a question of construction that was not verified against Rhode Island case law. |
| South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)(4) |
common law, with a statutory presumption | — | strongly encouraged by statute | South Carolina has no premarital agreement act. What it has instead is a marital-property definition that excludes ‘property excluded by written contract of the parties,’ and then provides that ‘Written contract’ includes any antenuptial agreement, ‘which must be considered presumptively fair and equitable so long as it was voluntarily executed with both parties separately represented by counsel and pursuant to the full financial disclosure to each other that is mandated by the rules of the family court as to income, debts, and assets.’ That is a statutory safe harbor built on separate counsel plus court-rule-level disclosure — a structure not found in any other state examined. |
| South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws §§ 25-2-16 to 25-2-25 (Uniform Premarital Agreement Act) |
UPAA | — | not addressed by statute | South Dakota’s UPAA is NOT the standard text and consumers should know it. The uniform act’s list of permitted subjects includes ‘the modification or elimination of spousal support’; South Dakota’s § 25-2-18(a) omits that item entirely (its list runs to seven items, not eight). South Dakota also omitted the uniform act’s public-assistance safety valve, so § 25-2-21 has no provision letting a court override a support waiver to keep an ex-spouse off public benefits. § 25-2-23 tolls any limitation period during the marriage but preserves laches and estoppel. § 25-2-22: if the marriage is void, the agreement is enforceable ‘only to the extent necessary to avoid an inequitable result.’ |
| Tennessee | Not confirmed. Tennessee remains unconfirmed. Treat as an open item. | |||
| Texas Tex. Fam. Code ch. 4, subch. A, §§ 4.001-4.010 (Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, short title at § 4.010); enforcement at § 4.006 |
UPAA | — | not required | Verbatim UPAA. § 4.002 writing and no consideration; § 4.003 permitted content including a child-support carve-out; § 4.006(a) the two grounds; § 4.006(b) unconscionability as a question of law; § 4.008 limitations tolled during marriage with laches and estoppel preserved. Subchapter B of the same chapter applies a near-identical enforcement test to partition or exchange agreements made DURING marriage, which is Texas’s postnuptial mechanism. The canonical statutes.capitol.texas.gov page is now a JavaScript application; the text was read from the Texas Legislative Council file server that backs it (https://tcss.legis.texas.gov/resources/FA/htm/FA.4.htm). |
| Utah Utah Code §§ 81-3-201 to 81-3-208 (Uniform Premarital Agreement Act) — RENUMBERED from Utah Code §§ 30-8-1 to 30-8-9 effective 9/1/2024 |
UPAA | — | not addressed by statute | Two Utah-specific traps. FIRST, the citation moved: Utah’s UPAA has been at Title 81 (Utah Domestic Relations Code), Chapter 3, Part 2 since 9/1/2024 — any form, article or lawyer letter still citing ‘Utah Code § 30-8-2’ is out of date. SECOND, and much more important for a consumer: Utah replaced the uniform act’s word ‘unconscionable’ with ‘FRAUDULENT’ throughout § 81-3-205. That is a far harder thing to prove. A Utah prenup that is merely lopsided — even grossly so — is not attackable on that basis; you have to show fraud plus all three disclosure failures. Utah also narrows choice-of-law: under § 81-3-203(1)(f) a court may apply the law of either party’s legal domicile instead ‘if it is fair and equitable.’ The public-assistance safety valve in § 81-3-205(2) survives. |
| Vermont |
common law | — | not addressed by statute | Vermont has NOT adopted the UPAA and has no premarital-agreement statute at all. This was confirmed by reading the complete chapter index of 15 V.S.A. (Domestic Relations) — chapters 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23 and 25 — plus the full section lists of chapter 1 (Civil Marriage, §§ 1-8) and chapter 3 (Rights of Married Women, §§ 61-141). None contains a premarital-agreement provision. Vermont’s enforceability test is therefore entirely judge-made; the controlling Vermont Supreme Court opinion we could not read from an official court host (the Judiciary’s opinion library search is title-indexed only and returned no results for ‘prenuptial’ or ‘antenuptial’), so no case is cited here. |
| Virginia Va. Code §§ 20-147 to 20-155 (Title 20, ch. 8, ‘Premarital Agreement Act’); content at § 20-150, enforcement at § 20-151 |
UPAA, adopted with a deviation | — | not required | Two deviations from the uniform text. First, Virginia’s disclosure prong has only TWO sub-elements, not three: the party ‘(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure … AND (ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure … beyond the disclosure provided.’ The UPAA’s third element — that the party did not have and could not reasonably have had adequate knowledge — is absent. Second, and more consequential for consumers, § 20-151(B) provides that ‘Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption that they are factually correct.’ So the boilerplate recital that both parties made full disclosure and signed voluntarily is itself evidence the challenger must overcome. Unconscionability is decided by the court as a matter of law and measured at execution. History: 1985, c. 434; 1986, c. 201. |
| Washington Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.120 (Agreements as to status) |
common law, with a community-property status statute | — | not required by statute | Washington has no premarital agreement act. RCW 26.16.120 permits both spouses or both domestic partners to agree jointly as to the status or disposition of community property, then owned or later acquired, TO TAKE EFFECT UPON THE DEATH OF EITHER — so it is a death-oriented community-property agreement statute rather than a divorce-oriented prenup statute. Form: written instrument under hand and seal, witnessed, acknowledged and certified like a deed. It expressly preserves the superior court’s power ‘to set aside or cancel such agreement for fraud or under some other recognized head of equity jurisdiction, at the suit of either party,’ and does not derogate from creditors’ rights. Prenup validity generally is judge-made and was NOT verified here. History: 2009 c 525 s 18; 2008 c 6 s 612; 1998 c 292 s 505; Code 1881 s 2416. |
| West Virginia W. Va. Code § 48-1-203 (Antenuptial or prenuptial agreement defined) |
common law, with a definitional statute | — | not required by statute | § 48-1-203 defines the agreement, expressly contemplates provisions defining property rights DURING the marriage as well as on death, annulment, divorce or separation — so West Virginia’s definition reaches postnuptial-style terms — and contains one hard rule: ‘A prenuptial agreement is void if at the time it is made either of the parties is a minor.’ The definition is written in gendered terms (‘an agreement between a man and woman’), which is a drafting artifact worth flagging rather than a live limitation. Validity standards beyond the definition are judge-made and were NOT verified here. |
| Wisconsin Wis. Stat. § 766.58 (Marital property agreements) |
own statute — Marital Property Act | — | expressly not required | The most counter-intuitive confirmed finding in this research, and directly relevant to the ‘one lawyer for both’ failure mode. Wis. Stat. § 766.58(8) provides that unconscionability is for the court as a matter of law, and then says in terms: ‘In the event that legal counsel is retained in connection with a marital property agreement the fact that both parties are represented by one counsel or that one party is represented by counsel and the other party is not represented by counsel does not by itself make a marital property agreement unconscionable or otherwise affect its enforceability.’ Wisconsin also uses a single ‘marital property agreement’ concept covering agreements made before OR during marriage, so it does not distinguish prenups from postnups the way most states do. |
| Wyoming No premarital agreement act. Related: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-102 (waiver of elective share and homestead allowance) |
common law | — | not addressed by statute | Wyoming has NOT adopted the UPAA. The complete text of Title 20 (Domestic Relations) was searched and contains no occurrence of ‘premarital’, ‘antenuptial’ or ‘prenuptial’. The only Wyoming statute that squarely governs a pre-marriage agreement is the probate-code waiver in § 2-5-102, which does impose a ‘fair disclosure’ requirement — so in Wyoming the clearest statutory protection attaches to giving up INHERITANCE rights, not divorce rights. The divorce-side test is judge-made and we could not read from an official court host here, so no case is cited. |
Two states quietly changed the words that matter. Utah replaced “unconscionable” with “fraudulent” throughout its enforcement test, which is a far harder thing to prove — a merely lopsided Utah prenup is close to unattackable on fairness grounds. And Utah’s act moved: it has been at Utah Code §§ 81-3-201 et seq. since 1 September 2024, so any form still citing § 30-8-2 is out of date. Meanwhile New Jersey deleted its second-look ground outright in 2013, so a New Jersey agreement is now judged only as of the day it was signed.
Where to go next
Four pages answer the questions this one does not.
Read this part
The Cusp is not a law firm and nothing on this page is legal advice. This is an explanation of how these agreements work and where they fall apart, written so you can have a better conversation with a lawyer — not so you can skip having one. Prenups are one of the few documents where doing it yourself reliably costs more than it saves, because the thing that voids them is almost never the wording. It is the process.
Every rule below is cited to a statute and linked to the state’s own text. Where we could not confirm a state, we say so instead of filling it in.