There is no alimony formula in Connecticut. Here is what the judge weighs instead.
No percentage, no bracket, no presumptive amount — for the final award or the temporary one. What the statute puts in its place, quoted in full.
Connecticut has no alimony formula, and this is not an oversight. There is no percentage of income, no bracket tied to the length of the marriage, no cap, and no presumptive amount — not for the award entered at the decree, and not for the temporary award that runs while the case is pending. The judge decides it on a list of factors.
The proof is sitting in the same chapter. Connecticut does have statewide guidelines with the force of regulation — for child support, under C.G.S. s. 46b-215a. The modification section, s. 46b-86(a), refers to them repeatedly. There is no counterpart for alimony anywhere in Chapter 815j, and no statewide alimony guideline is published on the Connecticut Judicial Branch’s own site. The legislature knew how to write a number when it wanted one.
OneWhat Connecticut does put a number on, and what it does not
The contrast is the clearest thing on this page, because both halves of it live in the same chapter of the same title.
Child support
Statewide guidelines with the force of regulation, C.G.S. s. 46b-215a, referred to throughout the modification section.
And an actual figure in the statute. From s. 46b-86(a): “There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any deviation of less than fifteen per cent from the child support guidelines is not substantial and any deviation of fifteen per cent or more from the guidelines is substantial.”
Alimony
No formula. No cap. No presumptive amount. No duration bracket. Nothing tied to income, and nothing tied to the length of the marriage.
The fifteen per cent presumption above is the only numeric figure in the modification section, and it does not touch alimony. It is a child support provision that happens to sit next door.
Two other states show what a legislature does when it decides to write a number. Florida caps durational alimony at the recipient’s reasonable need or 35 per cent of the difference between the parties’ net incomes, whichever is less, under Fla. Stat. s. 61.08(8)(c). New Hampshire writes a percentage into its own statute and even provides for what happens if the federal tax treatment changes. Connecticut has done neither.
TwoThe power the court actually has
Before the factors, the grant of authority — because the verb in it is “may”, and that is where the discretion starts.
C.G.S. s. 46b-82(a), opening words: “At the time of entering the decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b-81.”
C.G.S. s. 46b-83(a), on the temporary award: “At any time after the return day of a complaint under section 46b-45 or 46b-56 or after filing an application under section 46b-61, and after hearing, alimony and support pendente lite may be awarded to either of the parties from the date of the filing of an application therefor with the Superior Court.”
Read on Connecticut’s own legislature site. Checked 23 August 2026.Note the word Connecticut uses. Chapter 815j says alimony, and it distinguishes alimony ordered at the decree (s. 46b-82) from alimony pendente lite (s. 46b-83) and from periodic alimony and permanent alimony, both of which appear in the modification section (s. 46b-86). These are not interchangeable terms, and which one is in your order changes what can be done to it later.
ThreeWhat the judge has to weigh, in the statute’s own words
This is the list that stands where a formula would be. It governs whether there is an award at all, how much it is, and how long it runs — all three from the same sentence.
C.G.S. s. 46b-82(a), verbatim: “In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent’s securing employment.”
Unpacked into what each item actually asks, in the statute’s own order:
| The factor | What it reaches |
|---|---|
| Length of the marriage | First in the list — but see section four. Nothing in the chapter ties duration of the award to it. |
| The causes for the annulment, dissolution or legal separation | Why the marriage ended. This is the fault factor, and it is expressly in the final-award list. |
| Age | Of each party. |
| Health | Of each party. |
| Station | The standard of living established during the marriage. |
| Occupation | What each party does. |
| Amount and sources of income | Not only salary. “Sources” is doing work here. |
| Earning capacity | What a party could earn, which is not the same as what they do earn. |
| Vocational skills | Of each party. |
| Education | Of each party. |
| Employability | Of each party. |
| Estate and needs | What each party has, and what each party requires. |
| The property award under s. 46b-81 | Alimony is decided with one eye on the division of property, not separately from it. |
| For a custodial parent, the desirability and feasibility of securing employment | Applies only where custody of minor children has been awarded to that parent. |
Why this matters more than a formula would
A formula is predictable. A factor list is argued. In a state with a formula, the work is getting the inputs right. In Connecticut, the work is how the whole financial picture is presented — earning capacity against actual income, station against present need, the property award against the support award.
That cuts both ways, and it is worth being honest about the other edge: you cannot be told in advance what the number will be. Anybody who gives you a Connecticut alimony figure from a calculator is giving you an estimate with no statute behind it.
FourDuration: no bracket, but a requirement to explain
“The length of the marriage” is the first factor in the list. It is not a bracket, and nothing converts it into one.
What Connecticut does instead is unusual, and it is the closest thing in the chapter to a constraint on duration: it makes the court explain itself when an award has no end date.
C.G.S. s. 46b-82(b), verbatim: “If the court, following a trial or hearing on the merits, enters an order pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or section 46b-86, and such order by its terms will terminate only upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the alimony recipient, the court shall articulate with specificity the basis for such order.”
The verb is shall. An open-ended award is permitted, but it has to be justified on the record with specificity. That is a procedural check rather than a numeric one — and it is the only thing in Chapter 815j pointed at the length of an award.
FiveWhether behavior matters, and the one absolute bar
Connecticut’s answer differs depending on which award you are talking about, and the asymmetry is written into the statute rather than left to the judge.
| Award | Are the grounds for the divorce considered? |
|---|---|
| Final award, at the decree | Yes. “The causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation” is in the s. 46b-82(a) list. |
| Temporary award, pendente lite | No. Expressly read out of it. |
C.G.S. s. 46b-83(a), verbatim: “In making an order for alimony pendente lite, the court shall consider all factors enumerated in section 46b-82, except the grounds for the complaint or cross complaint, to be considered with respect to a permanent award of alimony.”
Same list, one item removed. So conduct can move the final number and cannot move the temporary one — which is worth knowing, because the temporary order often runs for a long time and often sets expectations for what follows.
The one absolute bar, and it is not about marital fault
Connecticut has exactly one provision that removes the court’s discretion altogether, and it is tied to a criminal conviction, not to the reasons a marriage failed.
C.G.S. s. 46b-82a(a), opening words: “Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 46b-82, 46b-83 and 46b-86, no court may enter an order of payment of temporary or permanent alimony from an injured spouse to a spouse who, at any time after the date of marriage, is convicted of” — and then five enumerated categories, beginning with criminal attempt and conspiracy to commit murder of the other spouse, class A or B felony sexual assault of the other spouse, and a class A or B felony family violence crime as defined in s. 46b-38a.
Termination of an existing award is mandatory on such a conviction. s. 46b-82a(c): “Any order of temporary or permanent alimony entered by a court from an injured spouse to a spouse subsequently convicted of a crime set forth in subsection (a) of this section against the injured spouse shall be terminated by the court upon a motion to terminate alimony based upon the conviction filed by the injured spouse.”
Section 46b-82a was enacted by P.A. 23-106 and amended by P.A. 23-136. Checked 23 August 2026.SixWhat ends it, what changes it, and what cannot be changed
Cohabitation is a ground to modify, not an automatic end
C.G.S. s. 46b-86(b), the operative words: the court “may, in its discretion and upon notice and hearing, modify such judgment and suspend, reduce or terminate the payment of periodic alimony upon a showing that the party receiving the periodic alimony is living with another person under circumstances which the court finds should result in the modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party.”
Read what that text does not say. It does not define “living with another person”. It sets no minimum period. And living together is not by itself enough — the arrangement must alter the financial needs of the recipient. Nothing happens automatically; somebody has to move.
And a privately negotiated clause displaces all of that. The closing sentence of s. 46b-86(b): “In the event that a final judgment incorporates a provision of an agreement in which the parties agree to circumstances, other than as provided in this subsection, under which alimony will be modified, including suspension, reduction, or termination of alimony, the court shall enforce the provision of such agreement and enter orders in accordance therewith.” If the two of you wrote your own trigger into the judgment, the court enforces your words and the statute’s financial-needs test does not apply.
Death, remarriage and retirement are not default endings
Connecticut does not legislate them as termination events. Section 46b-82(b) refers to an order that “will terminate only upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the alimony recipient” as something a court may order — not as a rule that operates of itself. Cohabitation is the one living-arrangement event the chapter addresses at all.
Modification, and how to make an award unmodifiable
C.G.S. s. 46b-86(a): “Unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification, any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support, an order for alimony or support pendente lite… may, at any time thereafter, be continued, set aside, altered or modified by the court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party…”
And on retroactivity: “No order for periodic payment of permanent alimony or support may be subject to retroactive modification, except that the court may order modification with respect to any period during which there is a pending motion for modification… from the date of service of notice of such pending motion upon the opposing party…”
Three things follow. First, non-modifiable alimony is expressly permitted, and the authority is the section’s opening words — unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification. Second, particular contingencies can be frozen by agreement: the section allows that “those items or circumstances that were contemplated and are not to be changed may be specified in the written agreement, stipulation or decision of the court.” Third, the date that matters for a modification is the date notice of the motion is served, not the date circumstances changed. Waiting costs money that cannot be recovered.
And when a substantial change is proved, the court goes back to the same list: s. 46b-86(a) directs it to determine what modification is appropriate “considering the criteria set forth in section 46b-82.” No formula on the way in, and no formula on the way back.
SevenThe tax rule changed in 2018, and most guides still describe the old one
For a divorce or separation instrument executed after 31 December 2018, alimony is not deductible by the person paying it and not taxable to the person receiving it. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act repealed the provisions that made it otherwise. For an instrument executed on or before that date the old treatment continues — deductible to the payer, taxable to the recipient — unless it is later modified and the modification expressly adopts the new rule.
Under the old rule a higher-rate payer could shift income to a lower-rate recipient and the two of them shared the saving. That saving no longer exists, which changes what any given number is worth to each side of the table — and in a state with no formula, it changes what a reasonable number even looks like.
Connecticut’s own income tax follows the federal treatment, so the federal answer above is the whole answer here, with no state adjustment either way. Four states do not follow it — Arkansas, California, New Jersey and New York — which is worth knowing rather than assuming if income or residence crosses a line. Connecticut also uses rolling conformity: a change to the federal Internal Revenue Code reaches Connecticut automatically, without the legislature having to act.
Authority: Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 115-97, s. 11051, repealing Internal Revenue Code sections 71 and 215; see also IRS Publication 504. State treatment: Connecticut Dept. of Revenue Services, Resident Income Tax Information.
Where all of this comes from
C.G.S. s. 46b-82 — alimony at the decree, the factor list, and the articulation requirement for open-ended awards. s. 46b-82a — the prohibition where the recipient is convicted of certain crimes against the payer. s. 46b-83 — alimony and support pendente lite. s. 46b-86 — modification, cohabitation, and retroactivity. All in Chapter 815j.
A note on the state’s own link. Connecticut’s legislature site serves an incomplete security certificate, so some browsers show a warning on it and some do not, depending on what they have cached. It is the state’s real site and the text is the real statute; the fault is in the state’s server configuration, not in the link.
Every quotation on this page was read from Connecticut’s own statute and is reproduced verbatim. Checked 23 August 2026. If a figure here has changed, or we have it wrong, tell us — corrections are published with the date and how long the error was live.
The rest of the Connecticut picture. The full alimony page is at alimony in Connecticut. The number that usually moves a budget more is child support, which does run on guidelines. What it costs to file is at what a Connecticut divorce costs, and the forms and deadlines are in the Connecticut divorce kit.
Free, no account, nothing to sign up for. If somebody you know has been handed a Connecticut alimony number and told it came from a calculator, section one is the part to send them.
The Cusp is not a law firm and does not provide legal, financial, or tax advice. This page quotes Connecticut statutes and summarizes what they say; it is not advice about any particular case, and whether a given rule applies to you depends on facts this page cannot know. How this site makes money is published in full.